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1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-608 
ILLINOIS, PETITIONER v. ALBERT KRULL, GEORGE 
LUCAS AND SALVATORE MUCERINO 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF ILLINOIS 
[February - , 1987] 
JusTICE O'CONNOR, dissenting. 
The Court today extends the good-faith exception to the 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary ... rule, United States v. 
Leon, 468 U. S. 897 (1984), in order to provide a grace period 
for unconstitutional search and seizure legislation during 
which the State is permitted to violate constitutional require-
ments with impunity. Leon's rationale does not support this 
extension of its rule and the Court is unable to give any inde-
pendent reason in defense of this departure from established 
precedent. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
The Court, ante, at --, accurately summarizes Leon's 
holding: 
"In Leon, the Court held that the exclusionary rule 
should not be applied to evidence obtained by a police of-
ficer whose reliance on a search warrant issued by a neu-
tral magistrate was objecti.vely reasonable, even though 
the warrant was ultimately found to be defective." 
The Court also accurately summarizes the reasoning support-
ing this conclusion as based upon three factors: the historic 
purpose of the exclusionary rule, the absence of evidence 
suggesting that judicial officers are inclined to ignore Fourth 
Amendment limitations, and the absence of any basis for be-
lieving that the exclusionary rule significantly deters Fourth 
Amendment violations by judicial officers in the search war-
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rant context. Ibid. In my view, application of Leon's 
stated rationales leads to a contrary result in this case. 
I agree that the police officer involved in this case acted in 
ob · ective ood faith in executing the search pursuant to Ill. 
Rev. tat., c . 5'2, ~ 5-40 e (1981) (repealed 1985). Ante, 
at--. And, as the Court notes, ante, at--, n. 13, the 
correctness of the Illinois Supreme Court's finding that this 
statute violated the Fourth Amendment is not in issue 'here. 
Thus, this case turns on the effect to be given to statutory 
authority for an unreasonable search. 
~e Cou~powerful historical basis for the 
exclusion of evidence gathered pursuant to a search author-
ized by an unconstitutional statute. Statutes authorizing un-
reasonable searches were the core concern of the Framers of 
the Fourth Amendment. This Court has repeatedly noted 
that reaction against the ancient Act of Parliament authoriz-
ing indiscriminate general searches by writ of assistance, 7 & 
8 Wm. III, c. 22, § 6 (1696), was the moving force behind the 
Fourth Amendment. Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 
583-584, and n. 21 (1980); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 476, 
481-482 (1965); Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 
624-630 (1886). James Otis' argument to the royal Superior 
Court in Boston against such overreaching laws is as power-
ful today as it was in 1761: 
". . . I will to my dying day oppose with all the pow-
ers and faculties God has given me, all such instruments 
of slavery on the one hand, and villany on the other, as 
this writ of assistance is. . . . 
". . . It is a power, that places the liberty of every man 
in the hands of every petty officer .... 
". . . No Acts of Parliament can establish such a writ; 
though it should be made in the very words of the peti-
tion, it would be void. An act against the constitution is 
void." 2 Works of John Adams 523-525 (C. Adams ed. 
1850). 
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See Paxton's Case, Quincy 51 (Mass. 1761). James Otis lost 
the case he argued; and, even had he won it, no exclusionary 
rule existed to prevent the admission of evidence gathered 
pursuant to a writ of assistance in a later trial. But, histo-
ry's court has vindicated Otis. The principle that no legisla-
tive act can authorize an unreasonable search became embod-
ied in the Fourth Amendment. 
Almost 150 years after Otis' argument, this Court found it 
necessary, in order to effectively enforce the constitutional 
prohibition, to hold that evidence gathered in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment would be excluded in federal criminal 
trials. Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914). In 
Mapp_ v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), the rule was further ex-
tended to s tate criminal trials. This exclusionary rule has, 
of course, been regularly applied to evidence gathered under 
statutes that authorized unreasonable searches. See, e. g., 
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S. 85 (1979) (statute authorized 
search and detention of persons found on premises being 
searched pursuant to warrant); Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 
U. S. 465 (1979) (statute authorized search of luggage of per-
sons entering Puerto Rico); Almeida-Sanchez v. United 
States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973) (statute authorized search of 
automobiles without probable cause within border areas); 
Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40 (1968) (statute authorized 
frisk absent constitutionally required suspicion that officer 
was in danger); Bergerv. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (per-
missive eavesdrop statute). Indeed, Weeks itself made clear 
that the exclusionary rule was intended to apply to evidence 
gathered by officers acting under "legislative . . . sanction." 
Weeks v. United States , supra, at 394. 
Leon on its face did not purport to disturb these rulings. 
" 'Those decisions involved statutes which, by their own 
terms, authorized searches under circumstances which did 
not satisfy the traditional warrant and probable-cause re-
quirements of the Fourth Amendment. ' Michigan v. 
DeFiltippo, 443 U. S., at 39. The substantive Fourth 
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Amendment principles announced in those cases are fully 
consistent with our holding here." United States v. Leon, 
468 U. S., at 912, n. 8. In short, both· the history of the 
Fourth Amendment and this Court's later interpretations of 
it, support application of the exclusionary rule to evidence 
gathered under the 20th century equivalent of the act au-
thorizing the writ of assistance. 
This history also supplies the evidence that Leon de-
manded for the proposition that the relevant state actors, 
here legislators, might pose a threat to the values embodied 
in the Fourth Amendment. Legislatures have, upon occa-
sion, failed to adhere to the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment, as the cited cases illustrate. Indeed, as noted, 
the history of the Amendment suggests that legislative abuse 
was precisely the evil the Fourth Amendment was intended 
to eliminate. In stark contrast, the Framers did not fear 
that judicial officers, the state actors at issue in Leon, posed a 
serious threat to Fourth Amendment values. James Otis is 
as clear on this point as he was in denouncing the unconstitu-
tional Act of Parliament: 
"In the first place, may it please your Honors, I will 
admit that writs of one kind may be legal; that is, special 
writs, directed to special officers, and to search certain 
houses, &c. specially set forth in the writ, may be 
granted by the Court of Exchequer at home, upon oath 
made before the Lord Treasurer by the person who asks 
it, that he suspects such goods to be concealed in those 
very places he desires to search." 2 Works of John 
Adams 524 (C. Adams ed. 1850). 
The distinction drawn between the legislator and the judicial l 
officer is sound. The judicial role is particularized, fact-spe-
cific and nonpolitical. Judicial authorization of a particular 
search does not threaten the liberty of everyone, but rather 
authorizes a single search under particular circumstances. 
The legislative act, on the other hand, sweeps broadly, au-
thorizing whole classes of searches, without any particular-
85-608--DISSENT 
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ized showing. A judicial officer's unreasonable authorization 
of a search affects one person at a time; a legislature's unrea-
sonable authorization of searches may affect thousands or 
millions and will almost always affect more than one. Cer-
tainly the latter poses a greater threat to liberty. 
Moreover, the Leon court relied explicitly on the tradition 
of judicial independence in concluding that, until it was pre-
sented with evidence to the contrary, there was relatively lit-
tle cause for concern that judicial officers might take the 
opportunity presented by the good-faith exception to author-
ize unconstitutional searches. "Judges and magistrates are 
not adjuncts to the law enforcement team; as neutral judicial 
officers, they have no stake in the outcome of particular crim-
inal prosecutions." United States v. Leon, supra, at 917. 
Unlike police officers, judicial officers are not "engaged in the 
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." John-
son v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14 (1948). The legisla-
ture's objective in passing a law authorizing unreasonable 
searches, however, is explicitly to facilitate law enforcement. 
Fourth Amendment rights have at times proved unpopular; it 
is a measure of the Framers' fear that a passing majority 
might find it expedient to compromise Fourth Amendment 
values that these values were embodied in the Constitution 
itself. Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532, 544 (1897). 
Legislators by virtue of their political role are more often 
subjected to the political pressures that may threaten Fourth 
Amendment values than are judicial officers. 
Finally, I disagree with the Court that there is "no reason 
to believe that applying the exclusionary rule" will deter leg-
islation authorizing unconstitutional searches. Ante, at 
--. "The inevitable result of the Constitution's prohibition 
against unreasonable searches and seizures and its require-
ment that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause is 
that police officers who obey its strictures will catch fewer 
criminals." Stewart, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1365, 1393 (1983). 
Providing legislatures a grace period during which the police 
85-608-DISSENT 
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may freely perform unreasonable searches in order to convict 
those who might have otherwise escaped creates a positive 
incentive to promulgate unconstitutional laws. Cf. Weeks v. 
United States, 232 U. S., at 392-393. While I heartily agree 
with the Court that legislators ordinarily do take seriously 
their oaths to uphold the Constitution and that it is proper to 
presume that legislative acts are constitutional, ante, at--, 
'it cannot be said that there is no reason to fear that a particu-
lar legislature might yield to the temptation offered by the 
Court's good faith exception. 
Accordingly, I find that none of Leon's stated rationales, 
see ante, at --, supports the Court's decision in this case. 
History suggests that the exclusionary rule ought to apply to 
the unconstitutional legislatively authorized search and this 
historical experience provides a basis for concluding that leg-
islatures may threaten Fourth Amendment values. Even 
conceding that the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule in 
this context is arguable, I am unwilling to abandon both his-
tory and precedent weighing in favor of suppression. And if 
I were willing, I still could not join the Court's opinion be-
cause the rule it adopts is both difficult to administer and 
anomalous. 
The scope of the Court's good-faith exception is unclear. 
Officers are to be held not "to have acted in good faith reli-
ance upon a statute if its provisions are such that a reason-
able officer should have known that the statute was uncon-
stitutional. Cf. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818 
(1982)." Ante, at--. I think the Court errs in importing 
Harlow's "clearly established law" test into this area, be-
cause it is not apparent how much constitutional law the rea-
sonable officer is expected to know. In contrast, Leon sim-
ply instructs courts that police officers may rely upon a 
facially valid search warrant. Each case is a fact-specific 
self-terminating episode. Courts need not inquire into the 
officer's probable understanding of the state of the law ex-
cept in the extreme instance of a search warrant upon which 
85-608---DISSENT 
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no reasonable officer would rely. Under the decision today, 
however, courts are expected to determine at what point a 
reasonable officer should be held to know that a statute has, 
under evolving legal rules, become "clearly" unconstitutional. 
The process of clearly establishing com~titutional rights is a 
long, tedious and uncertain one. Indeed, as the Court notes, 
ante, at --, n. 13, the unconstitutionality of the Illinois 
statute is not clearly established to this day. The Court has 
granted certiorari on the question of the constitutionality of a 
similar statutory scheme in New York v. Burger, 479 U. S. 
-- (1986). Thus, some six years after the events in ques-
tion in this case, the constitutionality of statutes of this kind 
remains a fair ground for litigation. Nothing justifies a 
grace period of such extraordinary length for an unconstitu-
tional legislative act. 
The difficulties in determining whether a particular statute 
violates clearly established rights are substantial. See 5 K. 
Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 27:24, p. 130 (2d ed. 
1984) ("The most important effect of [Davis v. Scherer, 468 
U. S. 183 (1984)] on future law relates to locating the line be-
tween established constitutional rights and clearly estab-
lished constitutional rights. In assigning itself the task of 
drawing such a line the Court may be attempting the impossi-
ble. Law that can be clearly stated in the abstract usually 
becomes unclear when applied to variable and imperfectly un-
derstood facts ... "). The need for a rule so difficult of appli-
cation outside the civil damages context is, in my view, dubi-
ous. Fairness to the defendant, as well as public policy, 
dictates that individual government officers ought not be sub-
jected to damages suits for arguable constitutional violations. 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 807 (1982) (citing Butz 
v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 506 (1978)). But suppression 
of illegally obtained evidence does not implicate this concern. 
Finally, I find the Court's ruling in this case at right an-
gles, if not directly at odds, with the Court's recent decision 
in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. - (1986). In Griffith, 
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the Court held that 1'basic norms of constitutional adjudica-
tion" and fairness to ·similarly situated defendants, id., at 
--, require that we give our decisions retroactive effect to 
all cases not yet having reached final, and unappealable, 
judgment. While the extent to which our decisions ought to 
be applied retroactively has been the subject of much debate 
among members of the Court for many years, id., at 
-- - --, there has never been any doubt that our deci-
sions are a.pplied to the parties in the case before the Court. 
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 301 (1967). The novelty of 
the approach taken by the Court in this case is illustrated by 
the fact that under its decision today, no effective remedy is 
to be provided in the very case in which the statute at issue 
was held unconstitutional. I recognize that the Court today, 
as it has done in the past, divorces the suppression remedy 
from the substantive Fourth Amendment right. See United 
States v. Leon, 468 U. S., at 905-908. It must be acknowl-
edged also that the exclusionary rule is a "judicially created 
remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights 
generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal 
constitutional right of the party aggrieved." United States 
v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 348 (1974). Moreover, the ex-
clusionary remedy is not made available in all instances when 
Fourth Amendment rights are implicated. See, e. g. , Stone 
v. Powell , 428 U. S. 465 (1976) (barring habeas review of 
Fourth Amendment suppression claims); United States v. 
Janis, 428 U. S. 433 (1976) (no suppression remedy for state 
Fourth Amendment violations in civil proceedings by or 
against the United States). Nevertheless, the failure to 
apply the exclusionary rule in the very case in which a state 
statute is held to have violated the Fourth Amendment de-
stroys all incentive on the part of individual criminal defend-
ants to litigate the violation of their Fourth Amendment 
rights. In my view, whatever "basic norms of constitutional 
adjudication," Griffith v. Kentucky, supra, at --, other-
wise require, surely they mandate that a party appearing be-
85-608-DISSENT 
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fore the Court might conceivably benefit from a judgment in 
his favor. The Court attempts to carve out a proviso to its 
good faith exception for those cases in which "the legislature 
wholly abandoned its responsibility to enact constitutional 
laws." Ante, at--. Under what circumstances a legisla-
ture can be said to have "wholly abandoned" its obligation to 
pass constitutional laws is not apparent on the face of the 
Court's opinion. Whatever the scope of the exception, the 
inevitable result of the Court's decision to deny the realistic 
possibility of an effective remedy to a party challenging stat-
utes not yet declared unconstitutional is that a chill will fall 
upon enforcement and development of Fourth Amendment 
principles governing legislatively authorized searches. 
For all these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
ILLINOIS v. ALBERT KRULL, GEORGE LUCAS AND 
SALVATORE MUCERINO 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME 
COURT OF ILLINOIS 
No. 85-608. Decided March-, 1986 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, dissenting. 
On July 5, 1981, Officer McNally of the Chicago Police De-
partment conducted a search of the premises of the Action 
Iron and Metal Company which revealed the presence of sev-
eral motor vehicles that had been reported as stolen. The 
officer proceeded pursuant to Illinois Vehicle Code 
§ 5-401(e), Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 95 12, § 5-401(e) (1981), which at 
the time authorized warrantless "examination[s]" of the busi-
ness premises of automotive parts dealers, scrap processors 
and parts recyclers. The next da the statute was declared 
unconstitutional by a Federal istric Court in a whol y unre-
lated ~e_.Q,_n ~~~~ a 1 ve e over roa 1scre ion 
in "'tiie police. - See- Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v. 
Fahner, 518 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
As a result of this discovery of the stolen cars respondents 
were charged with various counts related to the possession of 
stolen vehicles and false vehicle identification number plates. 
The trial court initially granted respondents' motion to sup-
press the evidence after finding that the cars had been dis-
covered without a warrant, probable cause or consent, and 
concluding that the inspection statute was unconstitutional 
on the basis of the District Court's holding in Bionic Auto 
Parts. 
During the pendency of an appeal by the State to the Illi-
nois Appellate Court, the Illinois legislature revised the stat-
ute to conform with Fourth Amendment standards. Be-
cause of this revision, an injunction issued in Bionic Auto 
Parts against enforcement of the statute was rendered moot 
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and was subsequently vacated. 721 F. 2d 1072 (CA7 1983). 
The Illinois Appellate Court thereafter remanded this case to 
the trial court to reconsider the constitutionality of§ 5-401(e) 
prior to its revision and to consider whether the good-faith 
reliance on the statute by Officer MeN ally was relevant to 
whether the evidence should be suppressed. On remand, 
the trial court again ruled that former§ 5-401(e) was invalid, 
and further ruled that the officer's good-faith reliance on the 
statue was irrelevant. 
The State took a direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme 
Court, which affirmed. 107 Ill. 2d 107, 481 N. E. 2d 703 
(1985). That court agreed that the statute was unconstitu-
tional because it "vested State officials with too much discre-
tion to decide who, when, and how long to search." Id., at 
116, 481 N. E. 2d, at 707. It then rejected the State's claim 
that evidence from a search made in good-faith reliance on 
§ 5-401(e) prior to any ruling that the statute was invalid 
should not be suppressed. In so holding, the court relied on 
//Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U. S. 31, 35-38 (1970), where 
this Court held that an arrest made in good-faith reliance on a 
Detroit ordinance was valid, together with a search incident 
to that arrest, despite the subsequent determination that the 
ordinance itself was unconstitutional. See 107 Ill. 2d, at 
117-119, 481 N. E. 2d, at 708. The Illinois court reasoned 
that 
"the Supreme Court in DeFillippo distinguished be-
tween substantive laws, which define criminal offenses, 
and procedural laws, which directly authorize searches. 
An arrest and search conducted pursuant to a substan-
tive law, like the Detroit ordinance, will be upheld, pro-
vided the officer has probable cause to make the arrest 
and he relied on the statute in good faith. In contrast, 
an arrest and search made pursuant to a procedural stat-
ute, not yet declared unconstitutional, and which author-
izes unlawful searches, will not be upheld, even though 
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the arrest and search were made in good-faith reliance 
on the statute." Id., at 118, 481 N. E. 2d, at 708. 
The Illinois court assumed that this Court "continues to uti-
lize the substantive-procedural dichotomy in determining 
whether a search conducted pursuant to a .statute was valid." 
Ibid. (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. -- (1984)). 
It is true that we have carved out a forbidden "category of 
statutes purporting to authorize searches without probable 
cause, which the Court has not hesitated to hold invalid as 
authority for unconstitutional searches." Ybarra v. Illinois, 
444 U. S. 85, 96, n. 11 (1979). See, e. g., Torres v. Puerto 
Rico, 442 U. S. 465 (1979); Almeida-Sanchez v. United 
States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973); Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 
40 (1968); Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967). More-
over, our opinions in Leon and DeFillippo further intimated 
that an officer's good-faith reliance on such procedural stat-
utes would be irrelevant in determining whether to suppress 
the evidence of a search under this line of precedent. See 
Leon, 468 U. S., at-, n. 8; DeFillippo, 443 U. S., at 39. 
None of these cases, however, squarely addressed that 
issue, which is presented in this case. No one disputes that 
such statutes may no longer be relied upon by police once 
they are declared constitutionally infirm. But noticeably ab-
sent from the Court's discussions in Leon and DeFillippo of 
this string of cases is any reference to the only case directly 
on point, United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531 (1975). 
In Peltier, Border Patrol agents conducted a warrantless 
search of an automobile pursuant to a procedural statute and 
supporting regulations subsequently held invalid by this 
Court in Almeida-Sanchez, supra. Nevertheless, we re-
fused to apply Almeida-Sanchez retroactively to suppress 
the evidence of the search when the Border Patrol agents had 
acted in good-faith reliance on the statute and regulations be-
fore they were declared invalid. The Court's reasoning was 
based principally on recognition that suppression of the evi-
dence would serve no valid purpose of the exclusionary rule: 
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"If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter un-
lawful police conduct then evidence obtained from a 
search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the 
law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly 
be charged with knowledge, that the search was uncon-
stitutional under the Fourth Amendment." 422 U. S., 
at 542. 
In reaching this holding, the Court explicitly noted that 
Almeida-Sanchez did not control because in that case the 
issue of good-faith reliance had never been raised by the Gov-
ernment. I d., at 542, n. 12. 
Nor should Peltier be read as some aberration from 
precedent as to good-faith reliance on a statute and the pro-
priety of suppression generally. For example, despite the 
dicta in Leon to the contrary, the Court's reasoning there 
clearly supports our holding in Peltier. In Leon we refused 
to suppress evidence seized in good-faith reliance on a war-
rant later held to be invalid. We observed that the principal 
purpose behind the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful po-
lice conduct. 468 U. S., at --. And in order for exclusion 
of evidence to have a deterrent effect, "it must alter the be-
havior of individual law enforcement officers or the policies of 
their departments." I d., at --. 
Indeed, Leon quoted the language from Peltier quoted 
above, see 468 U. S., at-- (quoting 422 U. S., at 542), and 
further quoted the following passage from Michigan v. 
Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 (1974), which was reiterated in Peltier, 
422 U. S., at 439: 
"The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule neces-
sarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or 
at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived 
the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evi-
dence gained as a result of such conduct, the courts hope 
to instill in those particular investigating officers, or in 
their future counterparts, a greater degree of care to-
ward the rights of an accused. Where the official con-
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duct was pursued in complete good faith, however, the 
deterrence rational loses much of its force." Leon, 468 
U. S., at-- (quoting 417 U. S., at 447). 
In recognition of this central purpose, no Fourth Amend-
ment interests would be advanced by suppressing evidence 
when the deterrent value from such suppression would be nil. 
As in Leon, suppressing evidence seized by officers relying in 
good faith on what they reasonably believed to be a valid pro-
cedural statute could hardly alter their behavior in any desir-
able fashion. 
The dicta in Leon and DeFillippo conflicts directly with the 
Court's holding in Peltier, and accordingly clarification for 
the benefit of other courts is called for. Because this case 
squarely presents the issue, I would grant the State's peti-
tion for certiorari and clarify the relevant law. 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
,ju.pr.nnt Q}ltttrl of tqt ~b ,jtatts 
Jfasltinghtn. ~. <Q:. 20,?~~ 
March 18, 1986 
RE: No. 85-608 - Illinois v. Krull 
Dear Lewis: 
My notes reflect that your vote at Conference was to "grant 
and reverse or deny" this case. Would the attached dissent from 
denial persuade you to change your vote to a "grant?" 
Regards, 
Justice Powell 
\ , c ~~~-4; 
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ILLINOIS v. ALBERT KRULL, GEORGE LUCAS AND 
SALVATORE MUCERINO 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME 
COURT OF ILLINOIS 
No. 85-608. Decided March -, 1986 
( THE CHIEF JUSTICE, with whom JUSTICE POWELL joins, 
dissenting. 
On July 5, 1981, Officer McNally of the Chicago Police De-
partment conducted ~h of the premises of the Action 
Iron and Metal Company which revealed the presence of sev-
eral motor vehicles that had been reported as stolen. The 
officer proceeded pursuant to Illinois Vehicle Code 
§ 5-401(e), Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 9512, § 5-401(e) (1981), which~ 
the time authorized warrantless "examination[s]" of the busi-
ness premises of automotive parts dealers, scrap processors 
and parts recyc ers. he next day e statuteWas declared 
unconstitutional by a Federal District Court in a wholly unre-
lated case on the ground that it vested overbroad discretion 
in the police. See Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v. 
Fahner, 518 F. Supp. 582 (ND Ill. 1981). 
As a result of this discovery of the stolen cars, respondents 
were charged with various counts related to the possession of 
stolen vehicles and false vehicle identification number plates. 
The trial court initially granted respondents' motion to sup-
press the evidence after finding that the cars had been dis-
covered without a warrant, probable cause or consent, and 
concluding that the inspection statute was unconstitutional 
on the basis of the District Court's holding in Bionic Auto 
Parts. 
During the pendency of an appeal by the State to the Illi-
nois Appellate Court, the IlJinois le_gis~ture revised the.stat-
ute to conform with Fourth Amendment standards. Be-
cause of this revision, an injunction issue m Bionic Auto 
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Parts against enforcement of the statute was rendered moot 
and was subsequently vacated. 721 F. 2d 1072 (CA7 1983). 
The Illinois Appellate Court thereafter remanded this case to 
the trial court to reconsider the constitutionality of§ 5-401(e) 
prior to its revision and to consider whether the good-faith 
reliance on the statute by Officer MeN ally was relevant to 
whether the evidence should be suppressed. On remand, 
the trial court again ruled that former§ 5-401(e) was invalid, 
and furtiier"'ruled that the officer's good-faith reliance on the 
statue was irrelevant. 
The State took a direct appeal to the Illinois Supre¥le 
Court, which affirmed. 107 Ill. 2d 107, 481 N. E. 2d 703 
(i985). That court agreed that the statute was unconstitu-
tional because it "vested State officials with too much discre-
tion to decide who, when, and how long to search." I d., at 
116, 481 N. E. 2d, at 707. It then re,kcted the State's clllim 
that evidence from a search made in good-faith reliance on 
§ 5-401(e) prior to any ruling that the statute was invalid 
should not be suppressed. In so holding, the court relied on 
../Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U. S. 31, 35-38 (1970), where 
this Court held that an arrest made in good-faith reliance on a 
Detroit ordinance was valid, together with a search incident 
to that arrest, despite the subsequent determination that the 
ordinance itself was unconstitutional. See 107 Ill. 2d, at 
117-119, 481 N. E. 2d, at 708. The Illinois court reasoned 
that .fl..~ . ~ /-
"the Supreme Court ir/l:_eFillippo distinguished be-
tween substantive laws, which define criminal offenses, 
.------anaprocedural f~;s, which directly authorize searches. -An arrest and search conducted pursuant to a substan-
tive law, like the Detroit ordinance, will be upheld, pro-
vided the officer has probable cause to make the arrest 
and he relied on the statute in good faith. In contrast, 
an arrest and search made pursuant to a procedural stat-
ute, not yet declared unconstitutional, and which author-
izes unlawful searches, will not be upheld, even though 
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the arrest and search were made in good-faith reliance 
on the statute." !d., at 118, 481 N. E. 2d, at 708. 
The Illinois court assumed that this Court "continues to uti-
lize the '§ubstantive-procedural dichotomy\'in determining 
whether a search conducted pursuant to a statute was valid." 
Ibid. (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. -- (1984)). 
It is true that we have carved out a forbidden "category of 
statutes purporting to authorize searches without probable 
cause, which the Court has not hesitated to hold invalid as 
authority for unconstitutional searches." Ybarra v. Illinois, 
444 U. S. 85, 96, n. 11 (1979). See, e. g., Torres v. Puerto 
Rico, 442 U. S. 465 (1979); Almeida-Sanchez v. United 
States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973); Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 
40 (1968); Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967). More-
over, our opinions in Leon and DeFillippo further intimated 
that an officer's good-faith reliance on such procedural stat-
utes would be irrelevant in determining whether to suppress 
the evidence of a search under this line of precedent. See 
Leon, 468 U. S., at --, n. 8; DeFillippo, 443 U. S., at 39. 
None of these cases, however, squarely addressed that 
issu'e;\Vhich is presented in this case-:- No one disputes that 
~h statUteS may no longer be relied upon by police once 
they are declared constitutionally infirm. But noticeably ab-
sent from the Court's discussions in Leon and DeFillippo of 
this string of cases is any reference to the only case direcpy J 
o~int, United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531 (1975). 
In Peltier, Border Patrol agents conducted a warrantless 
search of an automobile pursuant to a procedural statute and 
supporting regulations subsequently ~ by this 
Court in Almeida-Sanchez, supra. Nevertheless, we re-
fused t_o~~~~Y to suppress 
tile evidence of the search when the Border Patrol agents had 
acted in good-faith reliance on the statute and regulations be-
fore they were declared invalid. The Court's reasoning was 
based principally on recognition that suppressiol}_ of the evi-
dence would serve no valid purpose ofthe exclusionary rule: 
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"If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter un-
lawful police conduct then evidence obtained from a 
search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the 
law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly 
be charged with knowledge, that the search was uncon-
stitutional under the Fourth Amendment." 422 U. S., 
at 542. 
In reaching this holding, the Court explicitly noted that 
Almeida-Sanchez did not control because in that case the 
issue of good-faith reliance had never been raised by the Gov-
ernment. I d., at 542, n. 12. 
Nor should Peltier be read as some aberration from 
prece ent as to good-faith reliance on a sta u e and the pro-
priety of suppression generally. For example, despite the 
I 
dicta in Leon to the contrary, the Court's reas~g_Qlere 
crearry--3~ in Pertwr. !n-Lean we refused 
to suppress evidence seized m good-faith reliance on a war-
rant later held to be invalid. We observed that the prinCIPal 
pm:pose behind the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful po-
lice conduct. 468 U. S., at--. And in order for exclusion 
of evidence to have a deterrent effect, "it must alter the be-
havior of individual law enforcement officers or the policies of 
their departments." I d., at --. 
Indeed, Leon uoted the language from Peltier quoted 
above, see 4681:. ., at-- (quotmg 2 . ., a 2), and 
IilrtRer quoted the following passage from Michigan v. 
Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 (1974), which was reiterated in Peltier, 
422 U. S., at 439: 
"The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule neces-
sarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or 
at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived 
the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evi-
dence gained as a result of such conduct, the courts hope 
to instill in those particular investigating officers, or in 
their future counterparts, a greater degree of care to-
ward the rights of an accused. Where the official con-
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duct was pursued in complete good faith, however, the 
deterrence rational loses much of its force." Leon, 468 
U. S., at-- (quoting 417 U. S., at 447). 
In recognition of this central purpose, no Fourth Amend-
ment interests would be advanced by suppressing evidence 
when the deterrent value from such suppression would be nil. 
As in Leon, suppressing evidence seized by officers relying in 
good faith on what they reasonably believed to be a valid pro-
cedural statute could hardly alter their behavior in any desir-
able fashion. 
The dicta in Leon and DeFillippo conflicts directly with the 
Court's holding in Peltier, and accordingly clarification for 
the benefit of other courts is called for. Because this case 
squarely presents the issue, I would grant the State's peti-
tion for certiorari and clarify the relevant law. 
•, -
( 
Supplemental Preliminary Memo 
L'l 
January ~' 1985 Conference 




Krull ~: (junkyard oper-
ators ~ught stolen cars) 
Cert to s.ct. of Illinois 
(Moran, J., for a unanimous 
court) 
State/Criminal Timely 
This case was CFR'ed, and a response is now in. ~his 
supplemental memo is not primarily designed to summarize the 
reply, which is largely a repetition of the reasoning in the 
opinion below.l The reason for this supplemental memo is that, 
lThe reply, which largely tracks the reasoning of the Ill. 
S.Ct., does not directly rebut petr's argument as to why United 
States v. Peltier, 422 u.s. 531 (1975), should be controlling. 




having looked at the petition again, I wish to suggest a possible 
/ 
way of distinguishing United States v. Peltier, 422 u.s. 531 
(1975), and answering petr's argument that the good faith 
-~ 
exception should apply in this case involving an officer's 
~--~v-~ 
reliance on a defective procedural statute. 
The Court's opinion in Peltier emphasizes the fact that the 
holding in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 u.s. 266 (1976), 
was unexpected, in that the INS regulation held unconstitutional 
in Almeida-Sanchez had been in place over twenty years and had 
been uniformly upheld in the Courts of Appeals prior to being 
struck down in Almeida-Sanchez. See 422 u.s. at 540-541. 
Although Peltier contains some fairly broad language to the 
effect that suppression is proper "only if it can be said that 
the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be 
(Footnote 1 continued from previous page) 
s.ct. 3405, 3415 n. 8, and Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 u.s. 31, 
39, that the Ill S.Ct. relied on in its opinion. (For detail on 
the Ill. s.ct.'s opinion and petr's argument, please see the 
original pool memo.) 
The only point in the reply that is other than wholly predictable 
is resps' assertion that at the original suppression hearing, the 
trial court held that the detective who searched resps' premises 
exceeded his authority under the statute. Resps argue that this 
holding precludes this Court from reaching the issue of good 
faith reliance on the statute. I disagree. The Ill. s.ct. 
op1n1on in this case in no way relies on any holding that the 
officer exceeded his statutory authority, and doesn't even 
mention that the issue was argued. As noted in the original pool 
memo at page 8, it probably is true that if this case is granted, 
and if the Ill. s.ct.'s holding that the "good faith" exception 
doesn't apply is reversed, a remand will be necessary on the 
issue of whether the record supports a finding of good faith. 
But that's not a reason not to grant, since the issue of the 
officer's good faith in this case is of no general interest 
anyway. 
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charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional 
under the Fourth Amendment," 422 u.s. at 542, the holding in 
Peltier can be seen simply as a refusal to retroactively apply a 
"new" Fourth Amendment rule. See 422 u.s. at 535-539 (extensive 
discussion of retroactivity doctrine in cases involving the 
exclusionary rule). 
When the Court says in United States v. Leon, 104 S.Ct. 
3405, 3415e that "the exclusionary rule requires _<:'ppression 
of evidence obtained in searches carried out pursuant to 
statutes, not yet declared unconstitutional, purporting to 
~ ~------
authorize searches and seizures without 
warrants," 104 s.ct. at 3415 n.B, the cases cited as supporting ________.....,. 
authority are, with the exception of Almeida-Sanchez, not cases --involving new Fourth Amendment rules. Since there's no 
'----- ~~
indication in Leon that the Court considered Peltier 
questionable, I would conclude that what the Court had in mind in 
footnote 8 was the usual situation where overturning an 
unconstitutional procedural statute does not involve retroactive 
application of a new Fourth Amendment rule. In that case, 
Almeida-Sanchez shouldn't have been cited, in the interest of 
avoiding possible confusion.2 (The same is true of the citation 
of Almeida-Sanchez in DeFillippo, 443 u.s. at 39.) 
2while the holding in Almeida-Sanchez at first glance fits the 
language of the Leon footnote, Peltier makes clear that the 
holding in Almeida-Sanchez wasn't required on the grounds that 
/ ~ reliance on the 1nval1d INS regulation automatically required 
( application of the exclusionary rule. In Peltier, 422 u.s. at 
542 n. 12, the Court notes that in ~lmeida-Sanchez the government 
~ did not argue for a good-faith except1on to the exclusionary 
(Footnote continued) 
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A rule reconciling t .he holding in Peltier and the language 
quoted supra from Leon's footnote 8 (and the virtually identical 
-language from DeFillippo)-~d go as follows: The officer's 
good faith reliance on a procedural statute is only relevant if 
the invalidation of the statute involves application of a new 
Fourth Amendment rule announced by this Court after the date of 
the search in question. The question is whether such a rule 
makes sense as a matter of policy. Two possible rationales occur 
to me: 
1) The rule can be seen as making the officer who relies on 
an invalid procedural statute show that his reliance was not only 
reasonable, but that no matter how diligently he had considered 
the matter, he still would have concluded, on the basis of 
controlling law at the time of the search, that the search was 
legal. This "super good faith" requirement can be explained on 
the theory that it gives the officer an incentive to be 
especially sure before he bypasses the magistrate and searches 
without a warrant. Alternatively, the rule can be seen as based 
on the fact that if the officer had applied for a warrant, the 
magistrate would almost certainly have granted it, in which case 
the good faith exception would have applied. 
(Footnote 2 continued from previous page) 
rule. The Court also implies that application of a good-faith 
exception in Almeida-Sanchez might have created an advisory 
opinion problem. Ibid. In Leon, 104 s.ct. at 3422, the Court's 
opinion has language rejecting the idea that announcing a Fourth 
Amendment ruling but applying the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule creates advisory opinion problems. For 
purposes of considering the present case, it makes no difference 
whether or not the holding in Almeida-Sanchez was required by 
Article III considerations. 
\ 
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A possible rejoinder would be that this rationale doesn't 
work especially well in the context of this case. The officer 
who searched resps' premises didn't suspect that 'a crime had been 
committed~ he was carrying out a routine administrative search. 
Since the officer had no probable cause to believe a crime had 
been committed, he couldn't go to a magistrate for a warrant~ his 
only choices were to act pursuant to the administrative search 
statute or not act at all. Given that a) a properly drafted 
administrative search statute could constitutionally authorize 
searches of junk yards on less than probable cause, b) the 
statute under which the officer acted wasn't clearly 
unconstitutional, and c) not acting at all would give "chop 
shops" unwarranted freedom to ply their trade, it was (arguably) 
not unreasonable for the officers to act pursuant to the statute. 
2) Another argument in favor of the rule I described is that 
in cases involving invalid procedural statutes, deterrence can 
operate not only with respect to the officer, but also with 
respect to the legislature. It is reasonable to expect much more 
of a legislature than of an officer, and just because the officer 
acted in good faith is not a reason to uphold searches pursuant 
to a statute the legislature should have drafted better, or not 
at all. 
A possible rejoinder would be that, as a practical matter, 
legislatures aren't likely to write invalid procedural statutes 
with any greater frequency just because the Leon standard will 
apply in those cases involving searches made pursuant to such 




probably are (were) constitutional at the time they are (were) 
written (which in the case of older statutes may have predated 
incorporation of the Fourth Amendment) • If deterrence of 
legislatures is what is intended, the cost of the suggested rule 
outweighs any benefit. 
Conclusion: If the rule that I have suggested as a possible 
way of reconciling Peltier and the relevant passages from Leon 
and DeFillippo is acceptable to the Court, there's no reason to 
grant in this case. In holding that exclusion was required in 
this case, the Illinois s.ct. did not rely on any new Fourth 
amendment doctrine announced subsequent to the search of resps' 
junkyard. (The controlling case, in the Ill. S.Ct's view, is 
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 u.s. 307 (1978), which was 
decided over three years prior to the search of resps' premises.) 
On the other hand, Justices who favor narrowinq_the 
----------------------
exclusionary rule may still consider this case a potential 
candidate for a grant. 
January 6, 1986 Dimon Opinion in petn 
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Cert to~~of Illinois 
(Moran, or a unanimous 
court) 
Krull et al (junkyard oper-
ators w bought stolen cars) 
State/Criminal Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petitioner challenges lower court's decision 
that good faith exception to exclusionary rule does not apply 
~ 
where officers are alleged to have acted in good-faith reliance 
on unconstitutional statute authorizing warrantless 
~ --------=-
administrative searches of junk yards. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: On July ~' 1981, a detective 
from the Chicago Police Department entered the premises of Action 
C FK A New Wrl t'\\c:.\-e... ~N Le.-oN " 
M~\c:e_, 
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Iron and Metal Company for the purpose of performing a records 
inspection pursuant to §5-40l(e) of the Illinois Vehicle Code 
(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 95 1/2, §5-401 (e)) .1 Upon entering 
the premises and identifying himself as a police officer, the 
detective asked if he could see the yard's license and the 
records of vehicles that had been purchased by the yard, and also 
if he could examine vehicles in the yard. ~old by resp Lucas to 
"go right ahead," the detective proceeded to discover stolen 
vehicles on the premises, which led to the arrests of the three 
resps. Charges were brought against res~for possessing stolen 
vehicles and possessing false vehicle ID number plates. 
an unrelated case declared §5-40l(e) unconstitutional. Bionic 
Auto Parts et al. v. Tyrone c. Fahner, 518 F.Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill. 
1981). The Bionic Auto court held that §5-40l(e) did not meet 
the standard for statutes authorizing warrantless administrative 
searches set out in Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594.2 Although 
1 At the time of the search in question, Section 5-40l(e) 
provided that: 
"Every record required to be maintained under this Section 
[governing, inter alia, auto "wreckers" and rebuilders] shall be 
opened to inspection by the Secretary of State or any peace 
officer for inspection at any reasonable time during the night or 
day. Such examination may include examination of the licensee's 
established place of business for the purpose of determining the 
accuracy of required records." 
The statute has since been amended by the Illinois legislature. 
2 In Dewey, the Court upheld as reasonable warrantless 
administrative searches of mines authorized by the Federal Mine 
Safety and Health Act of 1977 (FMSHA). The Court emphasized "the 
substantial federal interest in improving the health and safety 
conditions in the Nation's ••. mines," 452 u.s. at 602, and found 
that Congress could reasonably conclude that a system of 
(Footnote continued) 
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warrantless searches may be necessary to deal with the problem of 
"chop shops" dealing in stolen vehicles, ~5-40l(e) vests overmuch 
discretion in inspectors as to "when to search and whom to 
search." 518 F.Supp. at 585 (quoting Dewey, 452 u.s. at 601). 
~he Bionic Auto court noted the evidence of administrative 
abuses, such as searches not aimed at verifying proper record-
keeping, stating that while administrative abuses are not per se 
a reason to invalidate §5-40l(e), they do point to the existence 
of overbroad discretion on the part of inspectors. 518 F.Supp. 
at 586. 
~he state TC in the present case granted resp's suppression 
motion relating to evidence seized during the search of July 5, 
basing suppression upon the holding in Bionic Auto, supra. ~he 
subsequent history of the case is summarized by petr as follows: 
(Footnote 2 continued from previous page) 
warrantless searches was necessary if the law was to be properly 
enforced, 452 u.s. at 602-603. ~he Court distinguished the 
authorization for warrantless OSHA searches declared 
unconstitutional in Marshall v. Barlows, Inc., 436 u.s. 307. The 
OSHA search statute "'devolve[d] almost unbr1dled discretion upon 
executive and administrative officers, particularly those in the 
field, as to whom to search and when to search.'" Dewey, 452 
u.s. at 601 (quoting Marshall, 436 u.s. at 601). By contrast, 
FMSHA effectively informed m1ne operators that they would be 
subject to mandatory administrative searches at least twice 
annually for surface mines and four times annually for 
underground mines. The Court also noted that the standards with 
which mine operators are expected to comply are specifically set 
forth in administrative regulations, so that mine operators are 
not left wondering about the purposes of an inspec~or or the 
limits of his task. 452 u.s. at 604. Furthermore, FMSHA 
specifically forbids forcible entries. Administrative inspectors 
refused entry must file an injunctive action to bar future 
refusals, thus giving operators a chance to show that proposed 
searches are outside the inspector's regulatory authority or 
infringe overmuch on "unusual privacy interests." 4S2 U.S. at 
605. 
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[On appeal from the TC suppression order,] the 
Appellate Court of Illinois, First Judicial District, 
vacated the judgment of the trial court and remanded 
the cause with the suggestion that the trial court 
reconsider the constitutionality of section 5-40l(e). 
In so doing the Appellate Court specifically directed 
that the trial court reconsider this case in light of 
the evolving considerations of good faith in cases 
before this Court at that time. 
[O]n remana ... ,the state trial judge reiterated 
his declaration the section 5-40l(e) was 
unconstitutional as it existed in July 1981. The trial 
court held that the issue of good faith had no 
applicability to reliance on an unconstitutional 
statute and reaffirmed his earlier decision suppressing 
the evidence. .•• [Petr] appealed this decision 
directly to the Illinois Supreme Court. 
Petn at 9, 10. 
The Ill.S.Ct. affirmed, finding that the unamend eg version 
of §5-40l(e) vested excessive discretion in enforcement officers 
and did not define regular enforcement procedures, thus failing 
the test for administrative search statutes established in 
Donovan v. Dewey, supra. The court rejected petr's argument 
that the search in this case is valid even if §5-40l(e) is not, 
because the search was made in good-faith reliance on the 
statute. This Court's cases distinguish between good-faith 
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reliance on a substantive law and good-faith reliance on a 
procedural statute which authorizes unconstitutional searches. 
See, e.g., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 u.s. 31, 3~ (exclusionary 
rule not applied to search accompanying arrest for violation of 
unconstitutionally vague substantive statute~ prior cases 
involving searches pursuant to unconstitutional procedural 
statutes distinguished). See also United States v. Leon, 104 
S.Ct. 3405, 3415 n.8 (reaffirming the teaching of prior cases 
that "the exclusionary rule requires suppression of evidence 
obtained in searches carried out pursuant to statutes, not yet 
declared unconstitutional, purporting to authorize searches and 
seizures without probable cause or search warrants.") 
The Ill.S.Ct. also rejected petr's argument that resp ~ucas 
validly consented to the search of the ~ction Iron premises. 
Petr does not challenge this holding in its cert petn. 
3. CONTENTIONS: A search conducted pursuant to a 
procedural statute later held unconstitutional is nevertheless 
valid where the search is undertaken in good faith reliance on 
v 
the statute. In United States v. Peltier, 422 u.s. 531, this 
Court refused to suppress evidence seized by border patrols 
---------------...__~~ 
acting pursuant to an INS regulation authorizing warrantless 
------~--~~~.-......~-..._--
searches within 100 miles of the border, despite the fact that 
~
the regulation in question had been declared unconstitutional in 
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 u.s. 266. This Court's 
rationale for refusing to apply Almeida-Sanchez retroactively was 
that "evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only 
if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, 
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or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was 
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment." 422 u.s. at 542. 
Thus, in Peltier (and numerous other cases, such as United States 
v. Leon, supra) this Court has characterized the purpose of the 
exclusionary rule as deterrence of police misconduct. Petr 
argues that here, as in Peltier, exclusion of evidence seized in 
good-faith reliance on a facially constitutional procedural law 
cannot be justified as serving a rational deterrent purpose. 
4. DISCUSSION: Petr makes a poor choice of words in 
arguing that a search pursuant to an unconstltutional procedural 
statute is nonetheless "valid" if made in good-faith reliance on 
~ 
the statute. ~his Court did not hold that the search in Peltier 
was valid; rather, accepting the Government's concession that the 
search was unconstitutional, the Court refused to apply the 
exclusionary rule. Clearly, though, both petr and Ill.S.Ct. 
understood the issue of "validity" to be another way of 
considering whether the exclusiona~y rule should apply. 
Ill.S.Ct. variously phrased the issue as whether the search 
should be "upheld," petn app. at 19-20, whether the search was 
"valid," id. at 21, and whether good-faith reliance on the 
statute could "cure an otherwise illegal search," in. Since the 
only issue before the court was whether the evidence seized 
pursuant to the search was properly suppressed, it is probably 
overly formalistic to refuse to reach the substantive issue 
presented by this petn on account of petr's poor phrasing. 
Accordingly, from this point on I will consider the petn as 
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presenting the issue of whether the exclusionary rule was 
properly applied in this case. 
Petrs have a persuasive point in arguing that Peltier - ------
implies that a good-faith rule should apply in cases of reliance 
by law enforcement officers on a facially constitutional 
procedural statute subsequently ~eclared unconstitutional. On --------the other hand, Ill.S.Ct. also has a persuasive point in noting 
that other of this Court's cases, such as DeFillippo and Leon, 
seem to imply that reliance on an unconstitutional procedural 
statute is subject to more searching scrutiny than reliance on an 
unconstitutional substantive statute or reliance on facially 
valid warrant. I find it particularly puzzling that this Court in 
both DeFillippo, 443 u.s. at 39, and Leon, 104 s.ct. at 3415 
n.8, cited Almeida-Sanchez, supra, for the proposition that the 
exclusionary rule will apply when the search in question is 
carried out pursuant to an invalid procedural statute not 
previously declared unconstitutional. While it is true that the 
exclusionary rule was so applied in Almeida-Sanchez, Peltier 
would seem to indicate that, had the government argued for a 
good-faith exception in ALmeida-Sanchez, this Court would have 
agreed. One way to deal with the language from DeFillippo and 
Leon on which the Ill.S.Ct. relied is to note neither case 
specifically excludes the possibility that a good-faith exception 
could apply to reliance on a procedural statute. Also, the 
language in question can be characterized as dicta, although its 
repetition in two cases weighs against dismissing it casually. 
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Fairly good arguments could be made both pro and con on the 
issue of the officer's objective good faith in this case. The 
statute authorizes a narrower range of searches than OSHA nid, 
and serves a more pressing governmental interest, cf. Marshall, 
supra, but lacks several of the redeeming features of FMSHA, cf. 
Dewey. However, the questjon of the objective good faith of the 
officer in this case is not specifically raised in the petn, 
presumably because that question (as opposed to the generic 
question of whether a good-faith exception should apply) was not 
presented to the Ill.S.Ct. Thus, were the Court to take the case 
and find that a good-faith exception should apply, I assume that 
the case would have to be remanded for a hearing on the question 
of whether the officer's reliance on §5-40l(e) was objectively 
reasonable. That does not weigh against taking the case, in my 
opinion, since it is the issue of whether a good-faith exception 
should apply, and not its application tn this particular case, 
which is of general interest. 
Since the decision below is difficult to reconcile with ----------------
Peltier, and since the question presented seems likely to recur, 
this case may be worth plena~ev i ew. - Petr's poor phrasi ng of 
the question presented, both in the lower court and in the petn, 
is conceivably a reason to deny cert, though this approach 
strikes me as formalistic. I would assume that if the case is 
CFRed and resps treat the question presented as whether the 
exclusionary rule was properly applied in this case, there woul~ 
be no reason for this Court not to consider this the question 
presented. 
-9-
5. RECOHMENDA'I'ION: CFR with a view to a possible grant. 
There is no response. 
November 20, 1985 Dimon Opinion in petn 
March 18 , 1986 
85-608 Illinois v . Krull 
Dear Chief : 
Althouqh 1 still would prefer to reverse summarily , 
in view of your request, 1 will vote to qrant if you circu-
late your proPosed dissent from denial of cert . 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfps;ss 
... .. . 
I 
2nd DRAFT 








From: The Chief Justice 
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: _ftAR_-=2_.0~19'--"8'-""6~ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
ILLINOIS v. ALBERT KRULL, GEORGE LUCAS AND 
SALVATORE MUCERINO 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME 
COURT OF ILLINOIS 
No. 85-608. Decided March-, 1986 
r THE CHIEF JUSTICE, with whom JUSTICE POWELL joins, 
dissenting. 
On July 5, 1981, Officer McNally of the Chicago Police De-
partment conducted a search of the premises of the Action 
Iron and Metal Company which revealed the presence of sev-
eral motor vehicles that had been reported as stolen. The 
officer proceeded pursuant to Illinois Vehicle Code 
§ 5-401(e), Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 95Y:!, § 5-401(e) (1981), which at 
the time authorized warrantless "examination[s]" of the busi-
ness premises of automotive parts dealers, scrap processors 
and parts recyclers. The next day the statute was declared 
unconstitutional by a Federal District Court in a wholly unre-
lated case on the ground that it vested overbroad discretion 
in the police. See Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v. 
Fahner, 518 F. Supp. 582 (ND Ill. 1981). 
As a result of this discovery of the stolen cars respondents 
were charged with various counts related to the possession of 
stolen vehicles and false vehicle identification number plates. 
The trial court initially granted respondents' motion to sup-
press the evidence after finding that the cars had been dis-
covered without a warrant, probable cause or consent, and 
concluding that the inspection statute was unconstitutional 
on the basis of the District Court's holding in Bionic Auto 
Parts. 
During the pendency of an appeal by the State to the Illi-
nois Appellate Court, the Illinois legislature revised the stat-
ute to conform with Fourth Amendment standards. Be-
cause of this revision, an injunction issued in Bionic Auto 
2 ILLINOIS v. KRULL 
Parts against enforcement of the statute was rendered moot 
and was subsequently vacated. 721 F. 2d 1072 (CA7 1983). 
The Illinois Appellate Court thereafter remanded this case to 
the trial court to reconsider the constitutionality of§ 5-401(e) 
prior to its revision and to consider whether the good-faith 
reliance on the statute by Officer MeN ally was relevant to 
whether the evidence should be suppressed. On remand, 
the trial court again ruled that former§ 5-401(e) was invalid, 
and further ruled that the officer's good-faith reliance on the 
statue was irrelevant. 
The State took a direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme 
Court, which affirmed. 107 Ill. 2d 107, 481 N. E. 2d 703 
(1985). That court agreed that the statute was unconstitu-
tional because it "vested State officials with too much discre-
tion to decide who, when, and how long to search." Id., at 
116, 481 N. E. 2d, at 707. It then rejected the State's claim 
that evidence from a search made in good-faith reliance on 
§ 5-401(e) prior to any ruling that the statute was invalid 
should not be suppressed. In so holding, the court relied on 
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U. S. 31, 35-38 (1970), where 
this Court held that an arrest made in good-faith reliance on a 
Detroit ordinance was valid, together with a search incident 
to that arrest, despite the subsequent determination that the 
ordinance itself was unconstitutional. See 107 Ill. 2d, at 
117-119, 481 N. E. 2d, at 708. The Illinois court reasoned 
that 
"the Supreme Court in DeFillippo distinguished be-
tween substantive laws, which define criminal offenses, 
and procedural laws, which directly authorize searches. 
An arrest and search conducted pursuant to a substan-
tive law, like the Detroit ordinance, will be upheld, pro-
vided the officer has probable cause to make the arrest 
and he relied on the statute in good faith. In contrast, 
an arrest and search made pursuant to a procedural stat-
ute, not yet declared unconstitutional, and which author-
izes unlawful searches, will not be upheld, even though 
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the arrest and search were made in good-faith reliance 
on the statute." Id., at 118, 481 N. E. 2d, at 708. 
The Illinois court assumed that this Court "continues to uti-
lize the substantive-procedural dichotomy in determining 
whether a search conducted pursuant to a statute was valid." 
Ibid. (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. -- (1984)). 
It is true that we have carved out a forbidden "category of 
statutes purporting to authorize searches without probable 
cause, which the Court has not hesitated to hold invalid as 
authority for unconstitutional searches." Ybarra v. Illinois, 
444 U. S. 85, 96, n. 11 (1979). See, e. g., Torres v. Puerto 
Rico, 442 U. S . .465 (1979); Almeida-Sanchez v. United 
States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973); Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 
40 (1968); Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967). More-
over, our opinions in Leon and DeFillippo further intimated 
that an officer's good-faith reliance on such procedural stat-
utes would be irrelevant in determining whether to suppress 
the evidence of a search under this line of precedent. See 
Leon, 468 U. S., at --, n. 8; DeFillippo, 443 U. S., at 39. 
None of these cases, however, squarely addressed that 
issue, which is presented in this case. No one disputes that 
such statutes may no longer be relied upon by police once 
they are declared constitutionally infirm. But noticeably ab-
sent from the Court's discussions in Leon and DeFillippo of 
this string of cases is any reference to the only case directly 
on point, United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531 (1975). 
In Peltier, Border Patrol agents conducted a warrantless 
search of an automobile pursuant to a procedural statute and 
supporting regulations subsequently held invalid by this 
Court in Almeida-Sanchez, supra. Nevertheless, we re-
fused to apply Almeida-Sanchez retroactively to suppress 
the evidence of the search when the Border Patrol agents had 
acted in good-faith reliance on the statute and regulations be-
fore they were declared invalid. The Court's reasoning was 
based principally on recognition that suppression of the evi-
dence would serve no valid purpose of the exclusionary rule: 
4 ILLINOIS v. KRULL 
"If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter un-
lawful police conduct then evidence obtained from a 
search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the 
law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly 
be charged with knowledge, that the search was uncon-
stitutional under the Fourth Amendment." 422 U. S., 
at 542. 
In reaching this holding, the Court explicitly noted that 
Almeida-Sanchez did not control because in that case the 
issue of good-faith reliance had never been raised by the Gov-
ernment. I d., at 542, n. 12. 
Nor should Peltier be read as some aberration from 
precedent as to good-faith reliance on a statute and the pro-
priety of suppression generally. For example, despite the 
dicta in Leon to the contrary, the Court's reasoning there 
clearly supports our holding in Peltier. In Leon we refused 
to suppress evidence seized in good-faith reliance on a war-
rant later held to be invalid. We observed that the principal 
purpose behind the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful po-
lice conduct. 468 U. S., at --. And in order for exclusion 
of evidence to have a deterrent effect, "it must alter the be-
havior of individual law enforcement officers or the policies of 
their departments." I d., at --. 
Indeed, Leon quoted the language from Peltier quoted 
above, see 468 U. S., at-- (quoting 422 U. S., at 542), and 
further quoted the following passage from Michigan v. 
Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 (1974), which was reiterated in Peltier, 
422 U. S., at 439: 
"The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule neces-
sarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or 
at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived 
the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evi-
dence gained as a result of such conduct, the courts hope 
to instill in those particular investigating officers, or in 
their future counterparts, a greater degree of care to-
ward the rights of an accused. Where the official con-
. , 
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duct was pursued in complete good faith, however, the 
deterrence rational loses much of its force." Leon, 468 
U. S., at- (quoting 417 U. S., at 447). 
In recognition of this central purpose, no Fourth Amend-
ment interests would be advanced by suppressing evidence 
when the deterrent value from such suppression would be nil. 
As in Leon, suppressing evidence seized by officers relying in 
good faith on what they reasonably believed to be a valid pro-
cedural statute could hardly alter their behavior in any desir-
able fashion. 
The dicta in Leon and DeFillippo conflicts directly with the 
Court's holding in Peltier, and accordingly clarification for 
the benefit of other courts is called for. Because this case 
squarely presents the issue, I would grant the State's peti-
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85-608 Illinois v. Krull 
(Supreme Court of Illinois) 
MEMO TO FILE: 
Section 5-40l(e) of the Illinois Code as of July 
5, 1981, that provided that "every record required to be 
maintained [by businesses under other sections of the 
code] shall be open to inspection 
officer at any reasonable time. Such 
include examination of the premises of 
by any peace 
inspection may 
the licensee's 
established place of business for the purpose of 
determining the accuracy of required records." Acting 
pursuant to this statute, Detective McNally of the Chicago 
police force made a warrantless entry, during the daytime 
at a reasonable hour, of the business premises of an 
automobile scrap dealer. 
The officer identified himself to respondent Lucas 
who stated that he was in charge. The officer requested 
that he be allowed to inspect the company's license and 
records contained in what was known as the "police book". 
R. 26. Lucas stated that he could not locate the 
documents but did produce a yellow pad describing five 
vehicles that had been purchased. According to the 
2. 
state's brief, the officer asked Lucas if he objected to 
an inspection of the vehicles in the junk yard. Lucas 
replied "go right ahead". R. 26. Officer McNally noted 
the serial numbers of the vehicles, checked those on his 
mobile computer, and discovered that three of them had 
been reported stolen. He then seized the vehicles and 
arrested Lucas. Although respondent Mucerino was present 
he was not arrested until a later date. Respondent Krull, 
a licensee of the business, was not present and could not 
be located at that time. 
The only question presented, according to the 
state's brief, is as follows: 
"Whether the exclusionary rule was properly 
invoked in the lower court where the predicate 
search was authorized by a presumptively valid 
statute later found to violate the Fourth 
Amendment?" 
The respondent's brief presents different and 
more complex questions, at least one of which does not 
seem to me to be within the scope of our grant. See p. 
(i). Indeed, the briefs of the parties seem, at times, to 
be arguing different cases. 
* * * 
.). 
Our file on this case already is substantial. It 
includes a cert memo and a supplemental cert memo, both 
well written. In addition, it includes a printed opinion 
by the Chief Justice, in which I joined, dissenting from 
the denial of cert - the first vote of the Conference. 
Following circulation of the Chief's dissent, the case was 
granted - I do not recall by what vote. 
I may not have mentioned above (I have been 
interrupted in dictating this memo) that a federal 
district court subsequently held, in a different case, 
that theillinois statute was invalid because it conferred 
unnecessarily broad discretion on officers to conduct 
administrative searches. The trial court, following the 
decision of the federal DC, granted respondent's motion to 
suppress the evidence. On a second appeal (the first 
appeal now being irrelevant), the Illinois Supreme Court 
agreed that the evidence should be suppressed. It 
rejected the state's argument that the search had been 
made in good faith reliance on a presumptively valid 
statute prior to any ruling that the statute was invalid. 
The Illinois court distinguished Michigan v. DeFillippo, 
443 u.s. 31, 35-38, that sustained the validity of an 
arrest made in good faith on a presumptively valid Detroit 
.. .~· 
4. 
ordinance even though the ordinance subsequently was 
declared invalid. The Illinois court made a distinction 
between "substantive laws" {e.g., a criminal statute) and 
"procedural laws" {such as a statute authorizing 
searches). See the discussion of this distinction in the 
Chief Justice's opinion last Term. I am not persuaded 
that such a distinction makes sense in the context of 
whether the exclusionary should be applied. 
The CJ's opinion, and the briefs of the parties, 
debate the decisions, dicta, and relevance of several 
important cases including: United States v. Leon {Justice 
White's good faith decision); Almeida-Sanchez v. United 
States {with which I am quite familiar); and United States 
v. Peltier, 422 u.s. 531 {1975). The problem presented by 
this case is that as recently as Leon, 468 u.s., at 912, 
fn. 8, this Court recognized that the exclusionary rule 
may require suppression of evidence obtained in searches 
carried out pursuant to statutes subsequently declared 
unconstitutional. Respondent relies heavily on this dicta 
in Leon, and on similar statements - all or most of which 
are found in cases that I believe can be distinguished. 
The Chief's opinion last Term identifies United 
States v. Peltier as the "only case directly on point". 
5. 
As I well remember, border patrol agents conducted 
warrantless searches of an automobile pursuant to a 
procedural statute and regulations that were subsequently 
held invalid in Almeida-Sanchez. Nevertheless, we 
declined to apply Almeida-Sanchez retroactively, reasoning 
that suppression of the evidence would serve no valid 
purpose of the exclusionary rule. 
This is an exclusionary rule case, and I am 
influenced substantially by what I wrote in Calandra (the 
rule is judge-made not a constitutional mandate), and in 
Stone v. Powell, emphasizing that the purpose of the rule 
-----.... 
is to deter police misconduct. There is no other rational 
reason for a rule that suppresses - as Justice Black said 
in one of his dissents that I cited in Stone - evidence 
that often is the most reliable evidence that can be 
presented in a criminal prosecution. 
There is one point argued in respondent's brief 
that is not mentioned, as I recall, in either the state's 
brief or the amicus brief of the SG. Respondent 
repeatedly says that the trial court found that the 
officer's search exceeded the "bounds of the 
unconstitutional statute". Even assuming that the 
officers in good faith could rely on the statute at the 
d·" 
0. 
time of the search, by its terms the statute was limited 
to the "verification of the records". Thus, the argument 
is made that we do not need to reach the question upon 
which we granted certiorari. 
I am not yet persuaded there is any merit to this 
contention. The state's brief points out that the police 
officer asked Lucas (who had stated he was in charge) 
whether he objected to the officer's inspecting the 
vehicles in the junk yard, and that Lucas responded "go 
right ahead". R. 29. It is true that the trial court 
ruled that respondent Lucas had not given effective 
consent to the search (JA 19, 20), but the TC also found 
that the inspection was "permissible activity under the 
statute". The motion to suppress was based by the TC 
solely on the ground that the statute was 
unconstitutional. 
Subject to my clerk make a more careful 
examination of the question, I would read the TC's ruling 
that Lucas had not given effective consent to mean that 
Lucas' consent was limited to the response he gave Officer 
McNally as to inspecting the vehicles. His consent 
therefore was limited to that extent, and did not embrace 
7. 
the officer's warrantless authority to enter the records 
that pertain the vehicles. 
I will welcome the views of my law clerk in a 
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From: The Chief Justice 
Circulated: "AR 1 9 1986 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
ILLINOIS v. ALBERT KRULL, GEORGE LUCAS AND 
SALVATORE MUCERINO 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME 
COURT OF ILLINOIS 
No. 85-608. Decided March --, 1986 
THE CHIEF JusTICE, dissenting. 
On July 5, 1981, Officer McNally of the Chicago Police De-
partment conducted a search of the premises of the Action 
Iron and Metal Company which revealed the presence of sev-
eral motor vehicles that had been reported as stolen. The 
officer proceeded pursuant to Illinois Vehicle Code 
§ 5-401(e), Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 95 'l-2, § 5-401(e) (1981), which at 
the time authorized warrantless "examination[s]" of the busi-
ness premises of automotive parts dealers, scrap processors 
and parts recyclers. The next day the statute was declared 
unconstitutional by a Federal District Court in a wholly unre-
lated case on the ground that it vested overbroad discretion 
in the police. See Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v. 
Fahner, 518 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
As a result of this discovery of the stolen cars respondents 
were charged with various counts related to the possession of 
stolen vehicles and false vehicle identification number plates. 
The trial court initially granted respondents' motion to sup-
press the evidence after finding that the cars had been dis-
covered without a warrant, probable cause or consent, and 
concluding that the inspection statute was unconstitutional 
on the basis of the District Court's holding in Bionic Auto 
Parts. 
During the pendency of an appeal by the State to the Illi-
nois Appellate Court, the Illinois legislature revised the stat-
ute to conform with Fourth Amendment standards. Be-
cause of this revision, an injunction issued in Bionic Auto 
Pa1ts against enforcement of the statute was rendered moot 
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and was subsequently vacated. 721 F. 2d 1072 (CA 7 1983). 
The Illinois Appellate Court thereafter remanded this case to 
the trial court to reconsider the constitutionality of§ 5-401(e) 
prior to its revision and to consider whether the good-faith 
reliance on the statute by Officer MeN ally was relevant to 
whether the evidence should be suppressed. On remand, 
the trial court again ruled that former§ 5-401(e) was invalid, 
and further ruled that the officer's good-faith reliance on the 
statue was irrelevant. 
The State took a direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme 
Court, which affirmed. 107 Ill. 2d 107, 481 N. E. 2d 703 
(1985). That court agreed that the statute was unconstitu-
tional because it "vested State officials with too much discre-
tion to decide who, when, and how long to search." I d., at 
116, 481 N. E. 2d, at 707. It then rejected the State's claim 
that evidence from a search made in good-faith reliance on 
§ 5-401(e) prior to any ruling that the statute was invalid 
should not be suppressed. In so holding, the court relied on 
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U. S. 31, 35-38 (1970), where 
this Court held that an arrest made in good-faith reliance on a 
Detroit ordinance was valid, together with a search incident 
to that arrest, despite the subsequent determination that the 
ordinance itself was unconstitutional. See 107 Ill. 2d, at 
117-119, 481 N. E. 2d, at 708. The Illinois court reasoned 
that 
"the Supreme Court in DeFillippo distinguished be-
tween substantive laws, which define criminal offenses, 
and procedural laws, which directly authorize searches. 
An arrest and search conducted pursuant to a substan-
tive law, like the Detroit ordinance, will be upheld, pro-
vided the officer has probable cause to make the arrest 
and he relied on the statute in good faith. In contrast, 
an arrest and search made pursuant to a procedural stat-
ute, not yet declared unconstitutional, and which author-
izes unlawful searches, will not be upheld, even though 
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the arrest and search were made in good-faith reliance 
on the statute." ld., at 118, 481 N. E. 2d, at 708. 
The Illinois court assumed that this Court "continues to uti-
lize the substantive-procedural dichotomy in determining 
whether a search conducted pursuant to a statute was valid." 
Ibid. (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. -- (1984)). 
It is true that we have carved out a forbidden "category of 
statutes purporting to authorize searches without probable 
cause, which the Court has not hesitated to hold invalid as 
authority for unconstitutional searches." Ybarra v. Illinois, 
444 U. S. 85, 96, n. 11 (1979). See, e. g., Torres v. Puerto 
Rico, 442 U. S. 465 (1979); Almeida-Sanchez v. United 
States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973); Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 
40 (1968); Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967). More-
over, our opinions in Leon and DeFillippo further intimated 
that an officer's good-faith reliance on such procedn1·al stat-
utes would be irrelevant in determining whether to suppress 
the evidence of a search under this line of precedent. See 
Leon, 468 U. S., at-, n. 8; DeFillippo, 443 U.S., at 39. 
None of these cases, however, squarely addressed that 
issue, which is presented in this case. No one disputes that 
such statutes may no longer be relied upon by police once 
they are declared constitutionally infirm. But noticeably ab-
sent from the Court's discussions in Leon and DeFilltppo of 
this string of cases is any reference to the only case directly 
on point, United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531 (1975). 
In Peltier, Border Patrol agents conducted a warrantless 
search of an automobile pursuant to a procedural statute and 
supporting regulations subsequently held invalid by this 
Court in Almeida-Sanchez, supra. Nevertheless, we re-
fused to apply Almeida-Sanchez retroactively to suppress 
the evidence of the search when the Border Patrol agents had 
acted in good-faith reliance on the statute and regulations be-
fore they were declared invalid. The Court's reasoning was 
based principally on recognition that suppression of the evi-
dence would serve no valid purpose of the exclusionary rule: 
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"If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter un-
lawful police conduct then evidence obtained from a 
search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the 
law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly 
be charged with knowledge, that the search was uncon-
stitutional under the Fourth Amendment." 422 U. S., 
at 542. 
In reaching this holding, the Court explicitly noted that 
Almeida-Sanchez did not control because in that case the 
issue of good-faith reliance had never been raised by the Gov-
ernment. I d., at 542, n. 12. 
Nor should Peltier be read as some aberration from 
precedent as to good-faith reliance on a statute and the pro-
priety of suppression generally. For example, despite the 
dicta in Leon to the contrary, the Court's reasoning there 
clearly supports ou holding in Peltier. In Leon we refused 
to suppress evidence seized in good-faith reliance on a war-
rant later held to be invalid. We observed that the principal 
purpose behind the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful po-
lice conduct. 468 U. S., at--. And in order for exclusion 
of evidence to have a deterrent effect, "it must alter the be-
havior of individual law enforcement officers or the policies of 
their_ departments." I d., at --. 
Indeed, Leon quoted the language from Peltier quoted 
above, see 468 U. S., at-- (quoting 422 U. S., at 542), and 
further quoted the following passage from Michigan v. 
Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 (1974), which was reiterated in Peltier, 
422 U. S., at 439: 
"The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule neces-
sarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or 
at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived 
the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evi-
dence gained as a result of such conduct, the courts hope 
to instill in those particular investigating officers, or in 
their future counterparts, a greater degree of care to-
ward the rights of an accused. Where the official con-
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duct was pursued in complete good faith, however, the 
deterrence rational loses much of its force." Leon, 468 
U. S., at- (quoting 417 U. S., at 447). 
In recognition of this central purpose, no Fourth Amend-
ment interests would be advanced by suppressing evidence 
when the deterrent value from such suppression would be nil. 
As in Leon, suppressing evidence seized by officers relying in 
good faith on what they reasonably believed to be a valid pro-
cedural statute could hardly alter their behavior in any desir-
able fashion. 
The dicta in Leon and DeFillippo conflicts directly with the 
Court's holding in Peltier, and accordingly clarification for 
the benefit of other courts is called for. Because this case 
squarely presents the issue, I would grant the State's peti-
tion for certiorari and clarify the relevant law. 
ral 10/01/86 
To: Justice Powell October 1, 1986 
From: Bob cJ./ ~~. 
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Does the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
apply to evidence seized in reasonable reliance upon a statute 
subsequently found to be unconstitutional? 
I . BACKGROUND 
2. 
The Illinois legislature has enacted a comprehensive 
statute aimed at trafficking in stolen automobile parts. Persons 
who operate wrecking yards, among others, must obtain a license 
from the Secretary of State, and must maintain records of the 
identification numbers of all automobiles and automobile parts 
they purchase or sell. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 95 l/2, §5-301, 401.2 
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986). When the search and seizure at issue in 
this case occurred, the statute provided that: 
Every ~rd required to be maintained under this 
Section shall be o en to ection by the Secretary of 
State or his author1ze repres n tive or any peace 
officer for inspection at any reasonable time during 
the night or day. Sue 1 spec 1on rna yde 
exam~e remises of the - licensee's 
place o business for the purpose of 
the a~~~of re~ds. 
Id. §5-401 (e) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985). 
At about 10:30 am on July 5, 1981, Detective McNally of 
the Chicago Police Department visited a wrecking yard operated by 
resps. McNally identified himself to resp Lucas and asked to see 
the record of the yard's automobile purchases. Lucas answered --
~L~ 
that he did not know where to find the formal records, but gave J.a,{_ 
McNally a pad of yellow a er that Lucas said was a record of ..__./ 
vehicles purchased by the yard. McNally examined the paper and 
asked Lucas if he "had any objection to my looking at the cars in 
the yard." Lucas told McNally to "go right ahead." Petn app. 5-
6. 
He 
McNally noted the serial numbers of several cars in the yard. 
found that ~ree of the cars were stolen, and that the 
identification number had been removed from a fourth automobile. 
He seized all four automobiles and arrested Lucas. 
resps were arrested later. 





court held that the administrative search statute was 
~
unconstitutional because it failed to impose sufficient 
limitations on the discretion of law enforcement officers. 
Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v. Fahner, 518 F. Supp. 582 (N. 
D. Ill. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 721 F. 2d 1072 (CA7 
1983). After the DC issued its ruling, but before CA7 heard the 
appeal, the Illinois legislature amended the statute to require 
that inspections be made during business hours, that they not 
last longer than 24 hours, and that they not occur more than six 
times in any six-month period. CA7 addressed only the amended 
statute and found it constitutional. 
The state tc granted resps' motion to suppress the 
evidence. The tc concluded that the DC's holding in Bionic Auto 
Parts applied to all "pending prosecutions." The tc also found 
that Lucas did not consent to the search of the yard because 
Lucas believed he had no right to refuse permission. The IJ..l . 
/ 
Ct. App. remanded to allow the tc to consider whether the officer 
acted in good faith, and to consider the effect of CA7's 
decision. On remand, the tc stated that the officer's good faith~ 
~ -
is relevant only when the officer acts pursuant to a warrant. 
The tc reaffirmed its decision to suppress the evidence. The 
State appealed directly to the Ill. Sup. Ct., which affirmed. J.LG S /cf. 
The Sup. Ct. agreed that the statute was unconstitutional because 
\...___,_ it "vested State officials with too much discretion to decide 
4. 
who, when, and how long to search." Petn app. 16. The Sup. Ct. 
cited statements by this Court to support its holding that "a 
search made pursuant to a procedural statute, not yet declared 
unconstitutional, . . . which authorizes unlawful searches, will 
not be upheld, even though the ..• search [was] made in good-
faith reliance on the statute." Petn app. 20. 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Was the search permissible under the statute? Resps 
contend that the Court should not consider the possibility of a 
good-faith exception because Detective McNally's search exceeded 
the bounds of his authority under §504(e). Resps several times --assert that the tc made a finding of fact to this effect. 
It is undisputed that: (1) the only "record" shown to 
Detective McNally prior to the search was the yellow pad listing 
the identification numbers of five vehicles; and (2) that McNally 
checked the identification numbers of automobiles on the lot in 
addition to the five listed on the yellow pad. Resps assert that 
§504 (e) authorized only an inspection of the serial numbers on 
the five listed vehicles. 
Resps rely on the following statement of the tc, made from 
the bench: 
Had [McNally] only verified the four or five vehicles 
that were indicated on this particular sheet of paper, 
I think he would have been within his statutory 
authority; because the statute says first you check the 
records, then you have the opportunity to verify the 
records are accurate. It's a two-step process, Now, 
he didn't do that. 
T C. s df'· 
/ 
5. 
J.A. 29-30. Although the tc's statements are 
/-r--
troubling, I would 
'I ~ .. 
for · ' 
(1) ~&i'L 
three reasons. ~ the tc did not make an explicit finding .,/c. V-
~..u_ S/Ct-
that the officer exceeded the bounds of the statute. If the tc clt..d.. ~I-
conclude that the good-faith issue is properly presented, 
~ tf'"lA..; 
had made such · a finding, neither the tc nor the Ill. Sup. Ct. TC~j-a-.. c·-i..,."'. 
. ~ ~~4-ci. •• f 
should have reached the constitutional quest1on. c.§k±;J state ~. ~. 
courts did reac~he constitutional question, however. ~TC s 
the tc' s interpretation of the statute seems unreasonable, and ~-
~~ 
does not appear to be supported by any other authority. ~~-
Unannounced warrantless searches of wrecking yards are permitted ~ 
only because "chop-shop" operators will conceal the evidence of 
their wrongdoing if searches are announced in advance. 
Permitting "chop shop" operators to delay a search by 
"temporarily misplacing" their records would defeat the whole 
purpose of warrantless searches. ~ -rr~-t-0~ Court holds that 
the good-faith exception applies, the case will ·b-e remanded to 
the state court for a determination whether the officer acted in 
good faith. 
~
The state courts will then have an additional 
opportunity to determine whether the search was permissible under 
the statute. 
B. Does the good-faith exception apply? The reasoning of 
United States v. Leon, 468 u.s. 897 (1984), and United States v. 
Calandra, 414 u.s. 338 (1974), strongly supports extension of the 
good-faith exception to cases in which the law enforcement ~ 
offiCer c s 1n objectively reasonable reliance on a statute -----subsequently held unconstitutional. 
'. 
6. 
The exclusionary rule is "a judicially created remedy 
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through 
its deterrent effect." Calandra, 414 u.s., at 348. "As with any 
remedial device, the application of the rule has been restricted 
to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most 
efficaciously served. Id. The decision whether to apply the 
exclusionary rule in a given context turns on "weighing the costs 
and benefits" of withholding reliable evidence obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Leon, 468 U.S., at 907. 
In Leon the Court stated that the purpose of the 
exclusionary rule is to "deter police misconduct." 468 U.S., at 
916. If a police officer reasonably believes that a statute is 
constitutional, the officer cannot be deterred from conducting a 
search authorized by the statute because the officer has no 
reasonable basis for believing that the evidence will be 
suppressed. As in Leon, "' [e]xcluding the evidence can in no way 
affect [the officer's] future conduct unless it is to make him 
less willing to do his duty.'" 468 U.S., at 919-20. Once the 
statute has been held unconstitutional, of course, reliance on 
the statute is no longer "objectively reasonable." If the 
statute were "flagrantly abusive of Fourth Amendment rights," the 
police officer's reliance on it might be objectively unreasonable 
even before a court has passed on the constitutional question. 
See Brown v. Illinois, 422 u.s. 590, 610-11 (1975) (POWELL, J., 
concurring) • 
The Court observed in Leon that "there exists no evidence 
suggesting that judges and magistrates are inclined to ignore or 
7. 
subvert the Fourth Amendment." 468 U.S., at 916. There is no 
reason to believe that state legislators have any such 
inclination either. Legislators, including state legislators, 
are required by Article VI to take an oath to support the federal 
Constitution. Even if legislators were inclined to pass statutes 
that violate the Fourth Amendment, application of the 
exclusionary rule would have a negligible "incremental deterrent 
effect." Judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes 
authorizing searches is sufficient to deter legislators from 
exceeding constitutional bounds. In many cases individuals may 
bring a pre-enforcement action seeking a declaration that the 
statute is unconstitutional and an injunction prohibiting 
searches pursuant to the statute. (Illinois wrecking yard 
operators mounted such a challenge in the Bionic Auto Parts 
case.) Application of the exclusionary rule would increase 
level of detrrence hardly at all. 
The Court has already held that a law enforcement 
· • a f · h 1· ~£bstant~ · · 1 a· off1cer s goo - a1t re 1ance on r1~:na ~~nance 
later held unconstitutional does not JUStify application of the 
exclusionary rule. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 u.s. 31 (1979). 
/I 
I ~ 
suggests that the exclusionary rule would apply to a 
statute subsequently held to violate the Fourth 
DeFillippo, 443 U.S., at 39. The suggestion 
is repeated in Leon, 468 u.s., at 912 n. 8. Strictly speaking, 
however, these statements are only dicta. In an earlier case, 
moreover, the Court declined to exclude evidence obtained in 
~ reliance on a subsequently-invalidated border search statute. 
8. 
/~ 
United States v. Peltier, 422 u.s. 531 (1975). Although the 
precise question decided in Peltier was whether to apply 
retroactively the decision in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 
413 u.s. 266 (1973), the reasoning of Peltier supports a reversal ~ 
in this case. The Court said: "If the purpose of the 
exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct then 
evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it 
can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or 
may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was 
unconstituional under the Fourth Amendment." Id., at 542. 
There is no serious doubt that Detective McNally's · ~~ 
~~ 
reliance on §5-40l(e) was objectively reasonable. At the time of 
the search, the statute had not been held unconstitutional. The 
courts, including this Court, have upheld similar statutes 
authorizing warrantless administrative searches. Donovan v. 
Dewey, 452 u.s. 594 (1981). Section 5-401 (e) clearly satisfied 
two of the three constitutional requirements set out in Dewey 
before it was amended: the statute is directed at an industry 
subject to pervasive regulation, and there is a compelling public 
interest in performing inspections without a warrant. The courts 
later held that the statute did not place adequate limitations on 
law enforcement officers' discretion to search, the third 
requirement under Dewey. The statute came close, however. CA7 
upheld statute after the state legislature made fairly minor 
amendments. It seems likely that the search was authorized even 
under the amended statute. (It occurred during business hours; 
it lasted less than 24 hours; the yard had not been searched more 
9. 
than six times in the preceding six months.) At most Detective 
McNally committed a merely "technical" violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. See Brown v. Illinois, 611 U.S., at 610-11 (POWELL, 
J., concurring). 
C. Does this case present a question of retroactivity? t}AA:J 
Resps argue that this case presents that question whether Leon 
should be applied retroactively. The question is not within the 
Court's grant of cert. Moreover, the question whether Leon 
should be extended to this statutory context is simply not the 
same as the question whether Leon should apply retroactively to 
this case. 
In any event, resps retroactivity arguments are misguided. 
The Court has held that a construction of the Fourth Amendment 
that is not a "clear break with the past" applies to all 
convictions that are not yet final. United States v. Johnson, 
457 u.s. 537 (1982). The Court reasoned that "[f]ailure to 
accord ~ retroactive effect to Fourth Amendment rulings would 
'encourage police or other courts to disregard the plain purport 
of our decisions and to adopt a let's-wait-until-it's-decided 
approach.'" Id., at 561, quoting Desist v. United States, 394 
u.s. 244, 277 (Fortas, J. , dissenting) . The Court's opinion in 
Leon notes that "nothing in Johnson precludes adoption of a 
[limited] good-faith exception." 468 u.s., at 912 n. 9. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The deterrent effect of applying the exclusionary rule in 
~ cases such as this does not outweigh the cost of excluding 
10. 
evidence that it "typically reliable and often the most probative 
evidence bearing on the guilt or innocence of the defendant." 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976), citing Kaufman v. 
United States, 394 u.s. 217, 237 Cl969) (Black, J. dissenting). 
I recommend that you vote to reverse the judgment of the 
Ill. Sup. Ct. and remand for further proceedings. J ~ :l.-s~c: L ..{ .t.J 
ral 10/30/86 




No. 85-608, Illinois v. Krull ~ 
No. 85-759, Maryland v. Garrison 
No. 85-1027, Arizona v. Hicks 
Each of these three cases presents questions about the 
application of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
announced in United States v. Leon, 468 u.s. 897 (1984). This 
supplemental memorandum is an attempt to set out a unified ap-
proach to these questions. 
You will recall that Illinois v. Krull involves an offi-
cer's good faith reliance on a statute authorizing warrantless 
administrative searches. The statute subsequently was held un-
constitutional. Maryland v. Garrison is the case in which the 
officers obtained a valid warrant to search an apartment, but 
searched the apartment next door by mistake. In Arizona v. 
Hicks, the officers entered the apartment under exigent circum-
stances and then moved stereo components in order to read the 
serial numbers and determine whether the equipment was stolen. 
As I read Leon, the good faith exception should apply 
when, and only when, application of the exclusionary rule would 
--. 
not deter law enforcement officers from the illegal search or -
.<7."F. .• • .• 
I ) 
page 2. 
seizure at issue. This focus on deterrence is consistent with 
your opinion in Stone v. Powell. ~ 
I now consider, briefly, four possible applications of 
Leon to these cases in light of the deterrent purpose of the ex-
clusionary rule. 
1. Leon applies only when the officers reasonably rely 
on a warrant, and the warrant authorizes their action. This, it 
seems to me, is the narrowest plausible reading of Leon. It has 
the advantage of establishing a bright-line rule, but at the cost 
of excluding evidence in cases such as Krull, Garrison, and 
Hicks. It seems to me that the exception can be extended to per-
mit the jury to consider the evidence in at least some of these 
cases without any appreciable reduction in the deterrent effect 
of the exclusionary rule. 
2. Leon applies only when the officers reasonably rely 
on a warrant, even if the warrant does not authorize their ac-
tion. This approach would expand the exception to include Garri-
son. Of course, the magistrate did not authorize the search the 
officers actually made, and the officers lacked probable cause to 
conduct that search. Still, it is clear that the officers would 
not have acted any differently had they known the evidence would 
be excluded. If the focus is on deterrence, it seems pointless 
to exclude probative evidence because of this mistake. 
3. Leon applies only when the officers reasonably rely 
on a warrant or on a statute authorizing warrantless searches. 
If the officer is entitled to rely on the magistrate, I see no 
reason why he should not be entitled to rely on the legislature, 
·' 
page 3. 
so long as the statute does not clearly violate the Fourth Amend-
ment. There is no reason to think that legislatures are inclined 
to pass statutes that exceed the bounds of the Fourth Amendment. 
This approach would extend the exception to include Illinois v. 
Krull. 
4. Leon applies whenever the officer's behavior is 
objectively reasonable. This seems to me to be the broadest 
reading of Leon that is consistent with a focus on deterrence of 
police misconduct. As a practical matter, this approach would 
extend the exception to cases in which the officer relies on a '-- - ____ . ___ ......__ ________ ---· 
judicial decision that subsequently is reversed or, at the ex-
- --- ---
treme, conducts a warrantless search that is likely to be consti-
tutional in light of prior judicial decisions. This approach 
might allow the evidence obtained in Hicks to be admitted even if 
the officer's action is held to have violated the Fourth Amend-
ment. Although this approach may be sound in theory, I am uncom-
fortable with its practical effect. First, it is unrealistic to 
expect police officers to acquire a detailed knowledge of the 
vast body of Fourth Amendment decisions. Second, I am afraid 
this approach may be quite open-ended. Because Fourth Amendment 
decisions often turn on their particular facts, even a well-
trained officer must often be in doubt whether a particular 
search or seizure requires a warrant. If the officer knows that 
the evidence will be excluded if his action is held unconstitu-
tional, the officer is more likely to go to a magistrate. If the 
officer knows that the evidence will be admitted if his action 
page 4. 
was "reasonable" at the time, the officer is more likely to pro-
ceed without a warrant. 
I therefore recommend that you apply Leon only when the 
officer acts pursuant t~~ ~ statu:B that the officer 
reasonably believes authorizes the search or seizure. Ron-
ald has authroized me to say that he joins in this recommenda-
tion. 
\J~ 
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85-609 Illinois v. Krull 
MEMO TO FILE: 
I happen to be looking at my opinion in Brown v. 
Illinois - an opinion concurring in part with the Court 
opinion. At page 611, I stated: 
"At the opposite end of the spectrum lie 
• technical' violations of Fourth Amendment 
rights where, for example, officers in good 
faith arrest an individual in reliance on a 
warrant later invalidated or pursuant to a 
statute that subsequently is declared 
unconstitutional. See United States v. Kilgen, 
445 F.2d 280 (CAS)." 
I mention this merely to note that my view with 
respect to "good faith" where officers rely on a statute 
subsequently invalidated has not changed. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
cc: Bob 
To: The Chief Justice 
Justice Brennan / jJ 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-608 
ILLINOIS, PETITIONER v. ALBERT KRULL, GEORGE 
LUCAS AND SALVATORE MUCERINO 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF ILLINOIS 
[January-, 1987] 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In United States v. a;;m, 468 U. S. 897 (1984) , this Court 
ruled that the Fourth 'iinle'ndment exclusionary rule does not 
apply to evidence obtained by police officers who acted ill..Q.b-
jectively reasonable reliance upon a search warrant issued by 
~





found to be unsupported by probable cause. See also  
1 
/f-/9 ~ 
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U. S. 981 (1984). The 
present case presents the question whether a similar excep-~
tion to the exclusionary rule should be recognized when offi- -· 6 J 
cers act in objectively reasonable reliance upon a sY!tu.1e au- r~ Pk../ 
thorizing warrantless administrative searches, but wnere the c ~ 
statute is ultimately found to violate the Fourth Amendment. 
ct ~ bu.t v' (1~ I 
The State of Illinois, as part of its Vehicle Code, has a com- 1-t:. u .d ~ ~ 1 
prehensive statutory scheme regulating the sale of motor ve-~ r--' ,.-- ._., 
hicles and vehicular parts. See Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 95 112, A1 J l?./1( 
~~ 5-100 to 5-801 (1985). A person who sells motor vehicles, ~, 
or deals in automotive parts, or processes automotive scrap 
metal, or engages in a similar business must obtain a license 
from the Illinois Secretary of State. ~~ 5-101, 5-102, 5-301. 
A licensee is required to maintain a detailed record of all 
motor vehicles and parts that he purchases or sells, including 
the identification numbers of such vehicles and parts, and the 
85-608-0PINION 
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dates of acquisition and disposition. ~ 5-401.2. In 1981, the 
statute in its then form required a licensee to permit state of-
ficials to inspect these records "at any reasonable time during 
the night or day" and to allow "examination of the premises of 
the licensee's established place of business for the purpose of 
determining the accuracy of required records." Ill. Rev. 
Stat. ch. 95 112, ~ 5-401(e) (1981). 1 
Respondents in 1981 operated Action Iron & Metal, Inc., 
an automobile wrecking yard located in the city of Chicago. 
Detective Leilan K. MeN ally of the Chicago Police Depart-
ment regularly inspected the records of wrecking yards pur-
suant to the state statute. Tr. 12.2 On the morning of July 
5, 1981, he entered respondents' yard. !d., at 7. He identi-
fied himself as a police officer to respondent Lucas, who was 
working at the yard, and asked to see the license and records 
of vehicle purchases. Lucas could not locate the license or 
records, but he did produce a paper pad on which approxi-
mately five vehicle purchases were listed. I d., at 25-26. 
McNally then requested and received permission from Lucas 
to look at the cars in the yard. Upon checking with his mo-
bile computer the serial numbers of several of the vehicles, 
McNally ascertained that three of them were stolen. Also, 
the identification number of a fourth had been removed. 
McNally seized the four vehicles and placed Lucas under 
arrest. !d., at 8-9, 16-17. Respondent Krull, the holder of 
the license, and respondent Mucerino, who was present at 
the yard the day of the search, were arrested later. Re-
spondents were charged with various criminal violations of 
the Illinois motor vehicle statutes. 
'Paragraph 5-401 of the 1981 compilation was repealed by 1983 Ill. 
Laws No. 83-1473, § 2, effective Jan. 1, 1985. Its current compilation 
replacement bears the same paragraph number. 
2 Citations to the transcript refer to the Sept. 21, 1985, hearing on 
respondents' suppression motion held in the Circuit Court of Cook County. 
2 Record 24. 
85-60~0PINION 
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The state trial court (the Circuit Court of Cook County) 
granted respondents' motion to suppress the evidence seized 
from the yard. App. 20-21. Respondents had relied on a 
federal court ruling, issued the day following the search, that 
§ 5-401(e), authorizing warrantless administrative searches 
of licensees, was unconstitutional. See Bionic Auto Parts & 
Sales, Inc. v. Fahner, 518 F. Supp. 582 (ND Ill. 1981), aff'd 
in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part, 721 F. 2d 1072 
(CA 7 1983). The Federal District Court in that case had 
concluded that the statute permitted officers unbridled dis-
cretion in their searches and was therefore not "'a constitu-
tionally adequate substitute for a warrant.'" 518 F. Supp., 
at 585-586, quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594, 603 
(1981). The state trial court in the instant case agreed that 
the statute was invalid and concluded that its unconstitu-
tionality "affects all pending prosecutions not completed." 
App. 20. On that basis, the trial court granted respondents' 
motion to suppress the evidence. I d., at 20-21. 3 
The Appellate Court of Illinois, First Judicial District, 
vacated the trial court's ruling and remanded the case for fur-
ther proceedings. I d., at 22. It observed that recent devel-
opments in the law indicated that Detective McNally's good 
faith reliance on the state statute might be relevant in assess-
ing the admissibility of evidence, but that the trial court 
should first make a factual determination regarding 
McNally's good faith. Id., at 25. It also observed that the 
trial court might wish to reconsider its holding regarding the 
unconstitutionality of the statute in light of the decision by 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
upholding the amended form of the Illinois statute. See 
Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v. Fahner, 721 F. 2d 1072 
(CA7 1983).4 On remand, however, the state trial court 
3 The trial court also concluded that Lucas had not consented to the 
search. App. 20. That ruling is not now at issue here. 
'Following the decision of the District Court in Bionic Auto Parts & 
Sales, Inc. v. Fahner, 518 F . Supp. 582 (ND Ill. 1981), the Illinois Legisla-
85-608-0PINION 
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adhered to its decision to grant respondents' motion to sup-
press. It stated that the relevant statute was the one in ef-
fect at the time McNally searched respondents' yard, and 
that this statute was unconstitutional for the reasons stated 
by the Federal District Court in Bionic. It further con-
cluded that because the good faith of an officer is relevant, if 
at all, only when he acts pursuant to a warrant, Detective 
McNally's possible good-faith reliance upon the statute had 
no bearing on the case. App. 32-35.5 
The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed. 6 107 Ill. 2d 107, 
481 N. E. 2d 7 (1 8 . t s rue hat the state statute, 
as it existed at the time MeN ally searched respondents' yard, 
was unconstitutional. It noted that statutes authorizing 
warra~inistrative searches in heavily regulated in-
dustries had been upheld where such searches were neces-
sary to promote enforcement of a substantial state interest, 
and where the statute" 'in terms of [the] certainty and regu-
larity of its application, provide[d] a constitutionally ade-
quate substitute for a warrant."' Id., at 116, 481 N. E. 2d, 
at 707, quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594, 603 (1981). 
Although acknowledging that the statutory scheme authoriz-
ing warrantless searches of licensees furthered a strong pub-
lic interest in preventing the theft of automobiles and the 
trafficking in stolen automotive parts, the Illinois Supreme 
ture amended the statute to limit the timing, frequency, and duration of 
the administrative search. 1982 Ill. Laws No. 82-984, codified, as 
amended, at Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 95 112, ~ 5-403 (1985). See n. 1, supra. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit did not address 
the validity of the earlier form of the statute, for it held that the amended 
statute satisfied the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. See Bionic 
Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v. Fahner, 721 F. 2d 1072, 1075 (CA7 1983). 
5 The trial court also indicated that McNally may have acted outside the 
scope of his statutory authority when he examined vehicles other than 
those listed on the pad offered by Lucas. App. 29; 5 Record 2, 8. 
6 The State bypassed the Illinois intermediate appellate court and ap-
pealed directly to the Supreme Court of Illinois pursuant to Ill. S. Ct. Rule 
603. 
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Court concluded that the statute violated the Fourth Amend-
ment because it "vested State officials with too much discre-
tion to decide who, when, and how long to search." 107 Ill. 
2d, at 116, 481 N. E. 2d, at 707. 
The court rejected the State's argument that the evidence 
seized from respondents' wrecking yard should nevertheless 
be admitted because the police officer had acted in good-faith 
reliance on the statute authorizing such searches. The court 
observed that in Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U. S. 31 (1979), 
this Court had upheld an arrest and search made pursuant to 
an ordinance defining a criminal offense, where the ordinance 
was subsequently held to violate the Fourth Amendment. 
The Illinois court noted that this Court in DeFillippo had 
contrasted the ordinance then before_ih defining a substan-
tive criminal offense, with a procedural statute directly 
authorizing searches without a warrant or probable cause, 
and had stated that evidence obtained in searclies conducted 
pursuant to the latter type of statute traditionally had not 
been admitted. 107 Ill. 2d, at 118, 481 N. E. 2d, at 708. 
Because the Illinois statute did not define a substantive crim-
inal offense, but, instead, was a procedural statute directly 
authorizing warrantless searches, the Illinois Supreme Court 
concluded that good-faith reliance upon that statute could not 
be used to justify the admission of evidence under ari excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule. Id., at 118-119, 481 N. E. 2d, 
at 708. 
We granted certiorari,-- U. S. -- (1986), to consider 
whether a good-faith exception to the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule applies when an officer'& reliance on the 
constitutionality of a statute is o~le, but 
the statute is subsequently declared unconstitutional. 
II 
A 
When evidence is obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, the j~xclusionary rule usu-
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ally precludes its use in a criminal proceeding against the 
victim of the illegal search and seizure. Weeks v. United 
States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 
(1961). The Court has stressed that the "prime purpose" of \ 
the exclusionary rule "is to deter future unlawful police 
conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth 
Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures." 
United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 347 (1974). 
Application of the exc usionary rule "is neither intended nor 
able to 'cure the invasion of the defendant's rights which he 
has already suffered."' United States v. Leon, 468 U. S., at 
906, quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 540 (1976) 
(WHITE, J., dissenting). Rather, the rule "operates as 'a 
judicially created remedy designed ·-to safeguard Fourth 
Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, 
rather than a personal constitutional right of the party ag-
grieved."' Ibid., quoting Uni~ States v. Calandra, 414 
U. S., at 348. 
As with any remedial device, application of the exclusion-
ary rule properly has been restricted to those situations in 
which its remedial urpose is effectively advanced. Thus, in 
various circumstances, the ourt as examined whether the 
rule's deterrent effect will be achieved, and has weighed the 
likelihood of such deterrence against the costs of withholding 
reliable information from the truth-seeking process. See, 
e. g., United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 454 (1976) 
(evidence obtained by state officers in violation of Fourth 
Amendment may be used in federal civil proceeding because 
likelihood of deterring conduct of state officers does not 
outweigh societal costs imposed by exclusion); United States 
v. Calandra, 414 U. S., at 351-352 (evidence obtained in 
contravention of Fourth Amendment may be used in grand 
jury proceedings because minimal advance in deterrence of 
police misconduct is outweighed by expense of impeding role 
of grand jury). 
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In Leon, the Court held that the exclusionary rule should 
not be applied to evidence obtained by a police officer whose 
reliance on a search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate 
was objectively reasonable, even though the warrant was ul-
timately found to be defective. On the basis of three factors, 
the Court concluded that there was no sound reason to apply 
the exclusionary rule as a means of deterring misconduct on 
the part of judicial officers who are responsible for issuing 
warrants. First, the exclusionary rule was historically de-
signed "to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the 
errors of judges and magistrates." 468 U. S., at 916. Sec-
ond, there was "no evidence suggesting that judges and 
magistrates are inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth 
Amendment or that lawlessness among, these actors requires 
application of the extreme sanction of exclusion." Ibid. 
Third, and of greatest importance to the Court, there was no 
basis "for believing· that exclusion of evidence seized pursu-
ant to a warrant will have a significant deterrent effect on the 
issuing judge or magistrate." Ibid. The Court explained: 
"Judges and magistrates are not adjuncts to the law enforce-
ment team; as neutral judicial officers, they have no stake in 
the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions." I d., at 
917. Thus, the threat of exclusion of evidence could not be 
expected to deter such individuals from improperly issuing 
warrants, and a judicial ruling that a warrant was defective 
was sufficient to inform the judicial officer of the error made. 
The Court then considered whether application of the ex-
clusionary rule in that context could be expected to alter the 
behavior of law enforcement officers. In prior cases, the 
Court had observed that, because the purpose of the exclu-
sionary rule is to deter police officers from violating the 
Fourth Amendment, evidence should be suppressed "only if 
it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowl-
edge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the 
search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment." 
United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531, 542 (1975); see also 
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Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 447 (1974). Where the 
officer's conduct is objectively reasonable, the Court ex-
plained in Leon, 
'"[e]xcluding the evidence will not further the ends of 
the exclusionary rule in any appreciable way; for it is 
painfully apparent that . . . the officer is acting as a rea-
sonable officer would and should act in similar circum-
stances. Excluding the evidence can in no way affect 
his future conduct unless it is to make him less willing to 
do his duty."' United States v. Leon, 468 U. S., at 920, 
quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 540 (WHITE, J., 
dissenting). 
The Court in Leon concluded that a deterrent effect was 
particularly absent when an officer, acting in objective good 
faith, obtained a search warrant from a magistrate and acted 
within its scope. "In most such cases, there is no police ille-
gality and thus nothing to deter." 468 U. S., at 920-921. It 
is the judicial officer's responsibility to determine whether 
probable cause exists to issue a warrant, and, in the ordinary 
case, police officers cannot be expected to question that 
determination. Because the officer's sole responsibility 
after obtaining a warrant is to carry out the search pursuant 
to it, applying the exclusionary rule in these circumstances 
could have no deterrent effect on a future Fourth Amend-
ment violation by the officer. ld., at 921. 
B 
The approach used in Leon is equally applicable to the 
present case. The application of the exclusionary rule to 
suppress evidence obtained by an officer acting in objectively 
reasonable reliance on a statute would have as little deter-
rent effect on the officer's actions as would the exclusion of 
evidence when an officer acts in objectively reasonable reli-
ance on a warrant. Unless a statute is clearly unconstitu-
tional, an officer cannot be expected to question the judg-
ment of the legislature that passed the law. If the statute is 
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subsequently declared unconstitutional, excluding evidence 
obtained pursuant to it prior to such a judicial declaration will 
not deter future Fourth Amendment violations by an officer 
who has simply fulfilled his responsibility to enforce the stat-
ute as written. To paraphrase the Court's comment in Leon: 
"Penalizing the officer for the [legislature's] error, rather 
than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of 
Fourth Amendment violations." 468 U. S., at 921. 7 I 
Any difference between our holding in Leon and our hold-
ing in the instant case, therefore, must rest on a difference 
between the effect of the exclusion of evidence on · udicial of-
fie rs and the effect of the exc usio o evidence on e · sla-
tors. A though ese two groups clearly serve 1 erent 
functions in the criminal justice systerp...~. those differences are 
not controlling for purposes of this case. We noted in Leon 
as an initial matter that the exclusionary rule was aimed at 
deterring police misconduct. 468 U. S., at 916. Thus, leg-
islators, like judicial officers, are not the focus of the rule. 
Moreover, to the extent we consider the rule's effect on legis-
lators, our initial inquiry, as set out in Leon, is whether there 
is evidence to suggest that legislators "are inclined to ignore 
or subvert the Fourth Amendment." Ibid. Although legis-
lators are not "neutral judicial officers," as are judges and 
magistrates, id., at 917, neither are they "adjuncts to the law 
enforcement team." Ibid. The role of legislators in the 
criminal justice system is to enact laws for the purpose of 
7 Indeed, the possibility of a deterrent effect may be even less when the 
officer acts pursuant to a statute rather than a warrant. In Leon, the 
Court pointed out: "One could argue that applying the exclusionary rule in 
cases where the police failed to demonstrate probable cause in the warrant 
application deters future inadequate presentations or 'magistrate shopping' 
and thus promotes the ends of the Fourth Amendment. " 468 U. S., at 
918. Although the Court in Leon dismissed that argument as speculative, 
i bid., the possibility that a police officer might modify his behavior does not 
exist at all when the officer relies on an existing statute that authorizes 
warrantless inspections and does not require any pre-inspection action, 
comparable to seeking a warrant, on the part of the officers. 
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establishing and perpetuating that system. In order to ful-
fill this responsibility, legislators' deliberations of necessity 
are significantly different from the hurried judgment of a law 
enforcement officer "engaged in the often competitive enter-
prise of ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United States, 333 
U. S. 10, 14 (1948). Before assuming office, state legislators 
are required to take an oath to support the Federal Constitu-
tion. See U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 3. Indeed, by accord-
ing laws a presumption of constitutional validity, courts pre-
sume that legislatures act in a constitutional manner. See 
e. g., McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs , 394 U. S. 
802, 808-809 (1969); see generally 1 N. Singer, Sutherland on 
Statutory Construction § 2.01 (4th ed. 1985). 
There is no evidence suggesting that..Congress or state leg-
islatures have enacted a significant number of statutes per-
mitting warrantless administrative searches violative of the 
Fourth Amendment. Legislatures generally have confined 
their efforts to authorizing administrative searches of specific 
categories of businesses that require regulation, and the re-
sulting statutes usually have been held to be constitutional. 
See, e. g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594 (1981); United 
States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972); Colonnade Catering 
Corp. v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970); United States v. 
Jamieson-McKames Pharmaceuticals, Inc. , 651 F. 2d 532 
(CA8 1981), cert. denied, 455 U. S. 1016 (1982); see also 3 
W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 10.2, pp. 132-134, n. 89.1 
(Supp. 1986) (collecting cases). Thus, we are given no basis 
for believing that legislators are inclined to subvert their 
oaths and the Fourth Amendment and that "lawlessness 
among these actors requires application of the extreme sanc-
tion of exclusion." United States v. Leon, 468 U. S., at 916. 
Even if we were to conclude that legislators are different in 
certain relevant respects from magistrates, because legisla-
tors are not officers of the judicial system, the next inquiry 
necessitated by Leon is whether exclusion of evidence seized 
pursuant to a statute subsequently declared unconstitutional 
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will "have a significant deterrent effect," ibid., on legislators 
enacting such statutes. Respondents have offered us no rea-
son to believe that applying the exclusionary rule will have 
such an effect. Legislators enact statutes for broad, pro-
grammatic purposes, not for the purpose of procuring evi-
dence in particular criminal investigations. Thus, it is logi-
cal to assume that the greatest deterrent to the enactment of 
unconstitutional statutes by a legislature is the power of the 
courts to invalidate such statutes. Invalidating a statute in-
forms the legislature of its constitutional error, affects the 
admissibility of all evidence obtained subsequent to the con-
stitutional ruling, and often results in the legislature's enact-
ing a modified and constitutional version of the statute, as 
happened in this very case. There is ~qthing to indicate that 
applying the exclusionary rule to evidence seized pursuant to 
the statute prior to the declaration of its invalidity will act as 
a significant, additional deterrent. 8 Moreover, to the extent 
that application of the exclusionary rule could provide some 
incremental deterrent, that possible benefit must be weighed 
against the "substantial social costs exacted by the exclusion-
ary rule." ld., at 907. 9 When we indulge in such weighing, 
8 It is possible, perhaps, that there are some legislators who, for politi-
cal purposes, are possessed with a zeal to enact a particular unconstitution-
ally restrictive statute, and who will not be deterred by the fact that a 
court might later declare the law unconstitutional. But we doubt whether 
a legislator possessed with such fervor, and with such disregard for his 
oath to support the Constitution, would be significantly deterred by the 
possibility that the exclusionary rule would preclude the introduction of 
evidence in a certain number of prosecutions. Moreover, just as we were 
not willing to assume in Leon that the possibility of magistrates' acting as 
"rubber stamps for the police" was a problem of major proportions, see 468 
U. S., at 916, n. 14, we are not willing to assume now that there exists a 
significant problem of legislators who perform their legislative duties with 
indifference to the constitutionality of the statutes they enact. If future 
empirical evidence ever should undermine that assumption, our conclusions 
may be revised accordingly. See United States v. Leon, 468 U. S., at 
927-928 (concurring opinion). 
9 In Leon, the Court pointed out: "An objectionable collateral conse-
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we are convinced that applying the exclusionary rule in this 
context is unjustified. 
Respondents argue that the result in this case should be 
different from that in Leon because a statute authorizing 
warrantless administrative searches affects an entire indus-
try and a large number of citizens, while the issuance of a 
defective warrant affects only one person. This distinction 
is not persuasive. In determining whether to apply the ex-
clusionary rule, a court should examine whether such applica-
tion will advance the deterrent objective of the rule. Al-
though the number of individuals affected may be considered 
when "weighing the costs and benefits," ibid., of applying the 
exclusionary rule, the simple fact that many are affected by a 
statute is not sufficient to tip the balance if the deterrence of 
Fourth Amendment violations would not be advanced in any 
meaningful way. 10 
We also do not believe that defendants will choose not to 
contest the validity of statutes if they are unable to benefit 
directly by the subsequent exclusion of evidence, thereby 
resulting in statutes evading constitutional review. First, in 
Leon, we explicitly rejected the argument that the good-faith 
exception adopted in that case would "preclude review of the 
constitutionality of the search or seizure" or would cause 
defendants to lose their incentive to litigate meritorious 
quence of this interference with the criminal justice system's truth-finding 
function is that some guilty defendants may go free or receive reduced sen-
tences as a result of favorable plea bargains." I d., at 907. 
10 Moreover, it is not always true that the issuance of defective warrants 
will affect only a few persons. For example, it is possible that before this 
Court's rather controversial decision in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 
(1964), see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 238, and n. 11 (1983), a number 
of magistrates believed that probable cause could be established solely on 
the uncorroborated allegations of a police officer and a significant number 
of warrants may have been issued on that basis. Until that view was ad-
justed by this Court's ruling, many persons may have been affected by the 
syst~nting of warrants based on erroneous views of the standards 
necessary to establish probable cause. 
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Fourth Amendment claims. We stated that "the magnitude 
of the benefit conferred on defendants by a successful [sup-
pression] motion makes it unlikely that litigation of colorable 
claims will be substantially diminished." I d., at 924 and 
n. 25. In an effort to suppress evidence, a defendant has no 
reason not to argue that a police officer's reliance on a war-
rant or statute was not objectively reasonable and therefore 
cannot be considered to have been in good faith. Second, un-
like a person searched pursuant to a warrant, a person sub-
ject to a statute authorizing searches without a warrant or 
probable cause may bring an action seeking a declaration that 
the statute is unconstitutional and an injunction barring its 
implementation. Indeed, that course of action was followed 
with respect to the statute at issue in this case. Several 
businesses brought a declaratory ju~gment suit in federal 
district court challenging § 5-401(e) of the Illinois Vehicle 
Code, and the provision was declared unconstitutional. See 
Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v. Fahner, 518 F. Supp., at 
585. Subsequent to that declaration, respondents, in their 
state-court criminal trial, challenged the admissibility of evi-
dence obtained pursuant to the statute. App. 13-17.u 
The Court noted in Leon that the "good-faith" exception to 
the exclusionary rule would not apply "where the issuing 
11 Other plaintiffs have challenged state statutes on Fourth Amendment 
grounds in declaratory judgment actions. See California Restaurant 
Assn. v. Henning, 173 Cal.App. 3d 1069, 219 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1985) (orga-
nization of restaurant owners challenged constitutionality of state statute 
vesting authority in State Labor Commissioner to issue subpoenas com-
pelling production of books and records); Hawaii Psychiatric Soc. v. 
Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. 1028 (Haw. 1979) (action to enjoin enforcement of 
state statute that authorized issuance of administrative inspection war-
rants to search records of Medicaid providers); Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F . 2d 
1462 (CA9 1984) (parents sought declaration that school board guidelines 
authorizing warrantless searches by school principal and teacher were un-
constitutional); see also Mid-Atlantic Accessories Trade Assn. v. Mary-
land, 500 F . Supp. 834, 848-849 (Md. 1980) (challenging constitutionality of 
Maryland Drug Paraphernalia Act as violative of the Fourth Amendment 
and other constitutional provisions). 
.. 
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magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role in the manner 
condemned in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U. S. 319 
(1979)," or where the warrant was so facially deficient "that 
the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be 
valid." 468 U. S., at 923. Similar constraints apply to the 
exception to the exclusionary rule we recognize today. A 
statute cannot support objectively reasonable reliance if, in 
passing the statute, the legislature wholly abandoned its 
responsibility to enact constitutional laws. Nor can a law 
enforcement officer be said to have acted in good-faith reli-
ance upon a statute if its provisions are such· that a reason-
able officer should have known that the statute was uncon-
stitutional. Cf. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818 
(1982) ("government officials performing discretionary func-
tions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages 
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable per-
son would have known"). 12 
12 The Illinois Supreme Court did not consider whether an officer's objec-
tively reasonable reliance upon a statute justifies an exception to the exclu-
sionary rule. Instead, as noted above, the court rested its holding on the 
existence of a "substantive-procedural dichotomy," which it would derive 
from this Court's opinion in Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U. S. 31 (1979). 
See 107 Ill. 2d 107, 118, 481 N. E. 2d 703, 708 (1985). We do not believe 
the distinction relied upon by the Illinois court is relevant in deciding 
whether the exclusionary rule should be applied in this case. 
This Court in DeFillippo, which was decided before Leon, drew a dis-
tinction between evidence obtained when officers rely upon a statute that 
defines a substantive crime, and evidence obtained when officers rely upon 
a statute that authorizes searches without a warrant or probable cause. 
The Court stated that evidence obtained in searches conducted pursuant to 
the latter type of statute traditionally had been excluded. 443 U. S., at 
39. None of the cases cited in DeFillippo in support of the distinction, 
however, addressed the question whether a good-faith exception to the ex-
clusionary rule should be recognized when an officer's reliance on a statute 
was objectively reasonable. Rather, those cases simply evaluated the con-
stitutionality of particular statutes, or their application, that authorized 
searches without a warrant or probable cause. See Torres v. Puerto Rico, 
442 U.S 465 (1979) (statute that allowed police to search luggage of any 
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III 
Applying the principle enunciated in this case, we neces-
sarily conclude that Detective McNally's reliance on the Illi-
nois statute was o~ble. 13 On several occa-
sions, this Court has upheld legislative schemes that 
authorized warrantless administrative searches of heavily 
person arriving at an airport or pier in Puerto Rico, without any require-
ment of probable cause, violated Fourth Amendment); Almeida-Sanchez v. 
United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973) (search pursuant to statute that al-
lowed United States Border Patrol to conduct warrantless searches within 
a "reasonable distance" from border, and regulation that defined such dis-
tance as 100 air miles, and without any requirement of probable cause vio-
lated Fourth Amendment); Berger v. New York , 388 U. S. 41 (1967) (stat-
ute that authorized court-ordered eavesdropping' without requirement that 
information to be seized be particularized violated Fourth Amendment). 
See also Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40 (1968) (search pursuant to stat-
ute that allowed officers to search an individual upon "reasonable suspi-
cion" that he was engaged in criminal activity was unreasonable because it 
was conducted without probable cause). See United States v. Leon, 468 
U. S., at 912, n. 8. 
For purposes of deciding whether to apply the exclusionary rule, we see 
no valid reason to distinguish between statutes that define substantive 
criminal offenses and statutes that authorize warrantless administrative 
searches. In either situation, application of the exclusionary rule will not 
deter a violation of the Fourth Amendment by police officers, because the 
officers are merely carrying out their responsibilities in implementing the 
statute. Similarly, in either situation, there is no basis for assuming that 
the exclusionary rule is necessary or effective in deterring a legislature 
from passing an unconstitutional statute. There is no basis for applying 
the exclusionary rule to exclude evidence obtained when a law enforcement 
officer acts in objectively reasonable reliance upon a statute, regardless of 
whether the statute may be characterized as "substantive" or 
"procedural." 
13 The question whether the Illinois statute in effect at the time of 
McNally's search was, in fact , unconstitutional is not before us. We are 
concerned here solely with whether the detective acted in good-faith reli-
ance upon an apparently valid statute. The constitutionality of a statutory 
scheme authorizing warrantless searches of automobile junkyards will be 
considered in No. 86-80, New York v. Burger, cert. granted, -- U. S. 
- (1986). 
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regulated industries. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594 
(1981) (inspections of underground and surface mines pursu-
ant to Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977); United 
States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972) (inspections of fire-
arms dealers under Gun Control Act of 1968); Colonnade 
Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970) (inspec-
tions of liquor dealers under 26 U. S. C. §§ 5146(b) and 7606 
(1964 ed.)). It has recognized that an inspection program 
may be a necessary component of regulation in certain indus-
tries, and has acknowledged that unannounced, warrantless 
inspections may be necessary "if the law is to be properly 
enforced and inspection made effective." United States v. 
Biswell, 406 U. S., at 316; Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S., at 
603. Thus, the Court explained in Donovan that its -prior 
decisions 
"make clear that a warrant may not be constitutionally 
required when Congress has reasonably determined that 
warrantless searches are necessary to further a regula-
tory scheme and the federal regulatory presence is suffi-
ciently comprehensive and defined that the owner of 
U
commercial property cannot helpbut be aware that his 
property will be subject to periodic inspections under-
taken for specific purposes." I d., at 600. 
In Donovan, the Court pointed out that a valid inspection 
scheme must provide, "in terms of the certainty and regular-
ity of its application ... a constitutiona)l1adequate substi-
tute for a warrant." !d., at 603. In '-.tMarshall v. Barlow's 
Inc., 436 U. S. 307 (1978), to be sure, the Court held that a 
warrantless administrative search under § 8(a) of the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970, was invalid, partly be-
cause the "authority to make warrantless searches devolve[ d) 
almost unbridled discretion upon executive and adminis-
trative officers, particularly those in the field, as to when to 
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search and whom to search." I d., at 323. 14 In contrast, the 
Court in Donovan concluded that the Federal Mine Safety 
and Health Act of 1977 imposed a system of inspection that 
was sufficiently tailored to the problems of unsafe conditions 
in mines and was sufficiently pervasive that it checked the 
discretion of government officers and established "a predict-
able and guided federal regulatory presence." 452 U. S., at 
604. 
Under the standards established in these cases, Detective 
MeN al~l~~~llinois statute authorizing war-
rantless inspectiOns of licensees was o ~ec 1 e y reasonable. 
In ruling- oiltfie-~fftuflomility, the Illinois 
Supreme Court recognized that the licensing and inspection 
scheme furthered a st~est, for it helped to "fa-
cilitate the discovery and prevention of automobile thefts." 
107 Ill. 2d, at 116, 481 N. E. 2d, at 707. The court further 
concluded that it was "reasonable to assume that warrantless 
administrative searches are necessary in order to adequately 
control the theft of automobiles and automotive parts." 
Ibid. The Court of A eals for the Seventh Circuit, uphold-
ing the amended version o e s atute, pointed out that 
used-car and automotive-parts dealers in Illinois "are put on 
notice that they are entering a field subject to extensive state 
regulation." See Bionic Auto Parts & Sales , Inc. v. 
Fahner, 721 F . 2d, at 1079. The Illinois statute was thus 
directed at one specific and heavily regulated industry, the 
authorized warrantless searches were necessary to the effec-
tiveness of the inspection system, and licensees were put on 
"The Court expressly limited its holding in Barlow's, to the inspection 
provisions of the Act. It noted that the "reasonableness of a warrantless 
search . . . will depend upon the specific enforcement needs and privacy 
guarantees of each statute," and that some statutes "apply only to a single 
industry, where regulations might already be so pervasive that a 
Collonade-Biswell exception to the warrant requirement could apply." 
436 U. S., at 321. 
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notice that their businesses would be subject to inspections 
pursuant to the state administrative scheme. 
According to the Illinois Supreme Court, the statute failed 
to pass constitutional muster solely because the statute 
"vested State officials with too much discretion to decide 
who, when, and how long to search." 107 Ill. 2d, at 116, 481 
N. E. 2d, at 707. Assuming, as we do for purposes of this 
case, that the Illinois Supreme Court was correct in its con-
stitutional analysis, this defect in the statute was not suffi-
ciently obvious so as to render a police officer's reliance upon 
the statute objectively unreasonable. The statute provided 
that searches could be conducted "at any reasonable time 
during the night or day," and seemed to limit the scope of the 
inspections to the records the businesses were required to 
maintain and to the business premises· "for the purposes of 
determining the accuracy of required records." Ill. Rev. 
Stat. ch. 95 112, ~ 5-401(e) (1981). While statutory provi-
sions that circumscribe officers' discretion may be important 
in establishing a statute's constitutionality, 15 the additional 
restrictions on discretion that might have been necessary are 
not so obvious that a reasonably objective police officer would 
have realized the statute was unconstitutional without 
them. 16 We therefore conclude that Detective MeN ally 
15 For example, the amended version of the Illinois statute, upheld by the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, incorporated the following: (1) 
the inspections were to be initiated while business was being conducted; (2) 
each inspection was not to last more than 24 hours; (3) the licensee or his 
representative was entitled to be present during the inspection; and (4) no 
more than six inspections of one business location could be conducted 
within any six-month period except pursuant to a search warrant or in re-
sponse to public complaints about violations. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 95 112, 
~ 5-403 (1985). 
16 Indeed, less than a year and a half before the search of respondents' 
yard, the Supreme Court of Indiana upheld an Indiana statute, authorizing 
warrantless administrative searches of automobile businesses, that was 
similar to the Illinois statute and did not include extensive restrictions on 
police officers' discretion. See State v. Tindell, 272 Ind. 479, 399 N. E. 2d 
746 (1980). 
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relied, in good faith, on a statute that appeared legitimately 
to allow a warrantless administrative search of respondents' 
business. 17 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois 
is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for fur-
the;pr0ceedings not inc~nsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
17 Respondents also argue that Detective MeN ally acted outside the 
scope of the statute, and that such action constitutes an alternative ground 
for suppressing the evidence even if we recognize, as we now do, a good-
faith exception when officers reasonably rely o~u;tatutes and act within the 
scope of those statutes. We have observed, see n. 5, supra, that the trial 
court indicated that McNally may have acted outside the scope of his statu-
tory authority. In its brief to the Illinois Supreme Court, the State com-
mented that "[McNally's] search was properly limited to examining the 
records and inventory of the Action Iron and Metal Company." 1 Record , 
Brief for Appellant 26. The Illinois Supreme Court, however, made no 
reference to the trial court's discussion regarding the scope of McNally's 
authority; instead, it affirmed the suppression of the evidence on the 
ground that a good-faith exception was not applicable in the context of the 
statute before it. 
We anticipate that the Illinois Supreme Court on remand will consider 
whether the trial court made a definitive ruling regarding the scope of the 
statute, whether the State preserved its objection to any such ruling, and, 
if so, whether the trial court properly interpreted the statute. At this 
juncture, we decline the State's invitation to recognize an exception for an 
officer who erroneously, but in good faith, believes he is acting within the 
scope of a statute. Not only would such a ruling be premature, but it does 
not follow inexorably from today's decision. As our opinion makes clear, 
the question whether the exclusionary rule is applicable in a particular con-
text depends significantly upon the actors who are making the relevant de-
cision that the rule is designed to influence. The answer to this question 
might well be different when police officers act outside the scope of a stat-
ute, albeit in good faith. In that context, the relevant actors are not legis-
lators or magistrates, but police officers who concededly are "engaged in 
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson v. 
United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14 (1948). 
_t9uprtutt Ofltltrl .d tlrt ~b _.hdte 
'lhtelfingfon. ~.Of. 211~,.~ 
CHAMI!IE:RS OP' 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
January 29, 1987 
Re: No. 85-608-lllinois v. Krull 
Dear Harry: 
I await the dissent. 
Justice Blackmun 





THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
,ju.p:rnttt <!fauri of tlrt 'Jnitt~ .iWts 
)Tasqmghtn. ~. ClJ. 21Tp~~ 
January 30, 1987 
Re: 85-608 - Illinois v. Krull 
Dear Harry: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely~ 
Justice Blackmun 
cc: The Conference 
ral 01/30/87 
January 30, 1987 
To: Justice Powell 
From: Bob 
No. 85-608, Illinois v. Krull 
This opinion is so long, and makes remarks about so many is-
sues unnecessary to the decision, that I have read it over twice 
in hopes of "catching" any potential problems. 
There is no doubt that the opinion reaches the right result: 
evidence obtained from searches and seizures made in objectively 
reasonable reliance on a statute subsequently held unconsti tu-
tional is admissible. JUSTICE BLACKMON's basic reasoning also is 
correct, from your perspective: the exclusionary rule serves a 
deterrent purpose, and excluding this evidence is unlikely to 
deter unconstitutional behavior. As you noted, the opinion re-
lies on Calandra and Stone v. Powell. 
The opinion makes the excellent point that deterrence is even ------less likely here than in Leon, because there is no possibility of 
------...._.;;. 
"magistrate shopping" by police. Also, persons who may be sub-
ject to search have an incentive to seek a declaration that the 
statute is unconstitutional, whereas a person searched pursuant 
to a defective warrant may have less incentive to challenge it. 
---) 
A~ You would perhaps prefer that footnote 8, p, 
11, be omitted, since it discusses the possibility that legisla-
tors may knowingly enact unconstitutional statutes out of "zeal" 
and for "political purposes." Perhaps JUSTICE BLACKMON would re-
page 2. 
phrase one or two sentences to say that the Court is unwilling to 
assume that legislators routinely disregard their oath to uphold 
the federal Constitution. 
I would omit footnote 10, p. 12, because I do not think it is 
convincing. A decision of this Court is likely to affect many 
individuals; a single warrant will not affect so many. The text 
contains a sufficient argument: although the number of persons 
affected by an unconstitutional statute is entitled to some 
weight, it does not "tip the balance of deterrence." 
The discussion of the limits to the good faith exception on 
p. 14 appears to track Leon exactly. The long footnote on the 
distinction between "substantive" and "procedural" statutes boils 
down to a simple statement, with which I agree, that there is no 
--------; 
meaningful basis for this distinction. Note 12, pp.l4-15. 
case 
hear 
The discussion of the application of the exception to this 
in Part III looks fine to me. As you know, the Court will 
arguments in v;;ew York v. Burger, No. 86-80, in February. 
This case presents the question whether a similar statute autho-
rizing warrantless searches of automobile "chop shops" in New 
York is valid. I think you will be of the opinion that the stat-
ute is valid. If so, JUSTICE BLACKMON's language may be helpful. 
I recommend a join. 
January 30, 1987 
85-608 Illinois v. Krull 
Dear Harry: 
I am sending you a separate join note. 
This is merely to mention a couple of points for 
your consideration. Footnote 8 discusses the possibility 
that legislators may knowingly enact unconstitutional stat-
utes out of "zeal", and for "political purposes". It seems 
to me that. this js rath~r unlikely. Perhaps it would be 
bettP.r to say that we are unwUling to assume that legisla-
tors would disregard their oath to act in acco-cd with law in 
this resp~ct. 
I would prefer to omit footnote 10, p. 12, because 
I ~o not think it . ts entirely convincing. A decision of 
thts Court coulo affect manv individuals, whereas a single 
warrant iR likely to have only a limited effect. I think 
you-c text is entirely adequate. 
The foregoing are quite minor, and my join ia un-





Janu~ry 10, 1987 
85-606 Illinois v. Krull 
Dear Harryz 
Please join me. 
Justice Blackmun 
lfp/ss 





JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
~mtt Qfourl 4tf tlt~ ~b ~fattg 
-b£rittgtolt. ~. <!f. 2.tl.;t,.~ 
Re: No. 85-608, Illinois v. Krull 
Dear Lewis: 
January 30, 1987 
Thank you for your letter of January 30 with its sugges-
tions. I purposefully inserted the material to which you 
make reference because of our anticipation as to what Sandra 
will say in dissent. The "scuttlebutt" has it that she had 
it in mind to say something about the motivation of legisla-
tors. For now, I would prefer to let matters lie quiet until 





JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
.in.prtntt (!fourt d tltt 'Jfuittb .italt.e' 
JIR#ltingtDtt, ~. Of. 21lgi'!' 
January 30, 1987 
No. 85-608 Illinois v. Krull 
Dear Harry, 
I plan to circulate a dissent in this case. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
CHA M BERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PA UL STEVE N S 
.. lqtrt"m.t Of01trl Df t:Jrt ~ttiltb ,httt6 
'Jht6Jrittghtn. ~. ~· 2llgi'!~ 
February 9, 1987 
Re: 85-608 - Illinois v. Krull 
Dear Harry: 
I shall await Sandra's dissent. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
.tqttnnt GfDltrl .n tlft ~ittb .ta.tt ... 
Jlulfiqton. J. elf. 21Tc?"' / CHAMBER S O F" JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 
· February 19, 1987 
Re: No. 85-608 - Illinois v. Krull 
Dear Harry: 
I would be pleased to join your op1n1on in the above case. 
I have one suggestion which may forestall future litigation. 
As I understand our holding, here, as in Leon (see 468 
u.s., at 897-898, n.20), , we are applying an objective test: If 
a reasonable police officer would have considered the statute 
valid, the product of the search is admissible. We do not 
conduct an inquiry into the subjective knowledge and belief of 
the particular officer involved. It seems to me that some 
explicit indication of that (along the lines of the first two 
sentences of the cited footnote in Leon) would be helpful. At a 
minimum, the last sentence of the penultimate paragraph of the 
opinion should be revised to read somewhat as follows: 
We therefore conclude that, since Detective McNally was 
objectively reasonable in acting under a statute that 
appeared legitimately to allow a warrantless 
administrative search of respondents' business, the 




Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 
.n,rtmt ~.mri gf tl{t ~ibb .tat.t• 
:Julfingtou. '· ~· 21Tc?"' 
February 23, 1987 
Re: Illinois v. Krull - No. 85-608 
Dear Harry: 
Thank you for considering my suggestions. Your 
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85-608 Illinois v. Krull (Bob) 
HAB for the Court 11/17/86 
lst draft 1/29/87 
2nd draft 2/23/87 
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